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Seldom in my life have I been near men of such contrasting qualities, joined in just one 
person: a very lively, quick and intuitive intelligence, and a grievous and idle intellectual 
laziness; a memory surprising in particulars, minutiae and frivolity and a not-less-
surprising failure of memory of the essential, of ideas, of sentiments; a varied, prompt 
and curious culture and a total ignorance of the most current problems of social life; a 
very refined elegance of style, of relations and of behavior and a vulgar carelessness of 
manners and accents…capricious in his admirations and in his affections, in his political 
tendencies and in his intellectual gestures. There was, in him, in a disturbing coexistence, 
something repulsive and something attractive. That ensured him very convinced 
detractors and admirers.1   
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Introduction 
Count Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo 
 
It was not my intention, while I was writing these hasty notes, to release them to the 
press just as they are […] But perhaps in this skeleton form and in the absolute lack 
of the superfluous are to be found the real merit of these diaries. Events are 
photographed without retouching, and the impressions reported are the first, the most 
genuine […] I was accustomed to jot down the salient happenings day by day, hour 
by hour, and perhaps at times repetitions or contradictions can be found, in the same 
way in which, very often, life repeats and contradicts itself.2   
 
 Galeazzo Ciano penned his final diary entry while sitting in cell 27 of Verona’s 
Scalzi Prison on December 23, 1943, just weeks before his execution. The diary, cradled 
in Ciano’s hands, bristled with emotional prose of his experiences throughout the 
turbulent and unpredictable years prior to and during World War Two, namely from 1937 
to 1943. Revealed in the pages are the confessions of a man who was a central figure in 
the Italian fascist regime, but who was plagued by his constant doubts of the regime’s 
leader, Benito Mussolini. 
Ciano was a prominent member of Mussolini’s cabinet, an ardent fascist and 
Mussolini’s son-in-law. He was known throughout Italy, and is still remembered today, 
for his sexual escapades, financial dishonesty and his unethical warmongering in Albania 
and Greece. He was a pompous and vain individual who reveled in a life brimming with 
wealth, elegance and prestige; but beneath this distasteful exterior, Ciano was a sensitive 
individual tormented by his undying love and devotion to his regime and its leader. Ciano 
                                                          
2. Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, ed. by Hugh Gibson (Safety Harbor: Simon 
Publications, 2001), 581. 
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thoroughly detested the men of the Third Reich and yearned to free Italy from her 
partnership with Germany, yet he made no active move to counteract Mussolini’s 
decision to align with Germany and enter the war at Hitler’s side in June 1940. When 
Italy’s political and military unpreparedness became strikingly evident and all hopes for 
an Italian victory were obliterated, Ciano’s disillusionment with Germany increased.  
The maturation of Ciano’s contempt created a major political divergence between 
him and Mussolini, a dictator handicapped by his desire to be a part of Hitler’s 
militaristic glory. The relationship between the Duce and his son-in-law was 
characterized by discontent and mistrust from the birth of the Axis alliance.  
 
The Italian Foreign Minister 
On April 24, 1930 Ciano married Edda Mussolini, Benito’s favorite daughter. 
Soon after he was transferred to China and became the Consul General and then the 
Chargé d’ Affaires. When the Second Italo-Abyssinian War began in October 1935, 
Ciano assumed an active role as a pilot. The Ethiopian War provided Ciano with an 
opportunity to assert his capability as an adroit solider and natural-born leader. Although 
his instructors referred to him as a “mediocre pilot,” Ciano “started the war by dropping 
the first bombs over Aduwa.  His plane was the first to be hit by an enemy bullet.  He was 
the first Italian flier to land in Addis Ababa at the war’s end.  For all this Galeazzo was 
promoted to the rank of major and was awarded two silver medals. Il Duce began to be 
convinced he had the makings of a leader.”3 Ciano’s military pursuits abroad translated 
                                                          
3. Time Magazine. “Lady of the Axis,” TIME Magazine 34, no. 4 (July 24, 1939), 19. 
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well with Mussolini, who believed that war set “the seal of nobility on those peoples who 
have the courage to face it.”4 On June 10, 1936, Galeazzo officially became the Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs at thirty-three years of age, the youngest to do so in 
European history.  
Opinions vary on the apparent ease of Ciano’s swift political ascent. Some argued 
that it was due to Galeazzo’s father, Costanzo Ciano,5 with whom Mussolini was 
incredibly close, that paved the way for Galeazzo’s success. Others maintained that it was 
Ciano’s marriage to Edda that largely aided his rise to political office. All these ideas 
were strongly refuted by Edda:  
I have often read in newspaper articles and books dealing with my father or my 
husband that Galeazzo Ciano had been appointed Foreign Minister only because 
he was Mussolini’s son-in-law. That is not only false, but it shows how little they 
knew my father. The Mussolini’s have always refused to indulge in nepotism.6  
Edda’s statement alludes to Mussolini’s fondness of Ciano in the early years of the 
Foreign Minister’s political career. There was a strong paternal bond that developed 
between the Duce and his son-in-law.  
Throughout his time in office, Ciano maintained an undying devotion to 
Mussolini and was often deeply moved by the Duce’s small expressions of gratitude. In 
his diary Ciano recounts an incident on July 4, 1938 when he was moved to tears by one 
of Mussolini’s speeches: “When I heard his voice,” Ciano admits, “I started to cry like a 
                                                          
4. Benito Mussolini, The Doctrine of Fascism (New York: Howard Fertig, 2006), 19.  
5. Costanzo was a highly decorated World War I veteran who was named senior commander at the 
wars end and was dubbed Count of Cortellazzo and Buccari by King Victor Emmanuel III. He became a 
devoted fascist and partook in the March on Rome in October 1922. From 1934 and nearly up until his 
death in 1939 he was president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. 
6. Edda Ciano, My Truth (New York: William Morrow, 1977), 98. 
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small child.”7 Episodes such as this, as recorded by Ciano, shed light on the complexity 
of his relationship with Mussolini. Ciano’s constant oscillations between his support for 
and aversion to Mussolini’s wartime policies, primarily from 1938 to 1940, make it 
challenging to pinpoint his specific mindset and feelings towards the Duce and the war in 
general. Ciano did not disapprove of the partnership for ethical reasons, but because it put 
Italy in a subordinate position and threatened her pursuit of military success and 
Mediterranean domination.  
Edda claimed that Ciano “had never liked Germany or the Germans” but it was 
not for political reasons but rather he had an innate aversion to the German culture- “he 
was a true Latin and therefore not attracted to their mentality.”8 His dislike only 
worsened with Hitler’s continuous betrayal of Mussolini. Ciano did not have the same 
contempt for the Allies, however, and he was drawn to their way of life and way of being. 
“[H]e enjoyed going to London and he much admired the English for their self-
possession, their humor, and their elegance.”9 Mussolini, on the other hand, greatly 
admired Germany. Not particularly the Third Reich, according to Edda, but the country’s 
great intellectual and militaristic figures- men like Kant, Wagner, Nietzsche, Goethe, 
Luther, Marx, Frederick II, and Bismarck.10 It was a quality that made the two men 
characteristically different and it greatly influenced their political mentality.  
                                                          
7. Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937-1938, translated by Andreas Mayor (New York: 
E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1953), 134. 
8. Edda, My Truth, 152. 
9. Edda, My Truth, 152. 
10. Edda, My Truth, 153. 
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Mussolini obdurately maintained that Italy and Germany shared a common 
destiny united by the wrongdoings each suffered at the end of World War One.11 The 
Duce hoped to establish an Axis alliance founded on loyalty; but in reality its true 
foundation was mired in competition and immense distrust. Mussolini’s own pride, 
perhaps driven not only by his innate aggressive nature but also by his fervent patriotism, 
clouded his perception of Italy’s desire to fight alongside Germany. Ciano, on the other 
hand, along with many leading Italian diplomats recognized the dangers in uniting with 
Hitler; however, not one of them spoke against the Italo-German alliance until 1943 when 
Italy was already up to her knees in war. Ciano used his diary as an outlet for his bouts of 
frustration with Mussolini and Hitler, and to express his growing concern of and hatred 
for Nazi Germany. Hitler’s dismissal of the 1938 Munich Pact initiated the beginning of 
Ciano’s disdain for the Third Reich; however he kept silent and continued to do so when 
the Pact of Steel was signed in May 1939, and later in August 1939 when Hitler broke the 
pact by entering what are today the Czech and Slovak Republics. War ensued weeks after 
in September 1939 yet Mussolini refused to break the alliance and Ciano did not actively 
oppose the Duce or leave office.  
Ciano’s decision to take part in the Grand Council meeting on July 24, 1943, 
which reinstated military power from Mussolini to the Monarchy, was a long time in the 
making. It was this event that led to Ciano’s downfall: he was labeled a traitor and killed. 
In the photograph taken right before his death, Ciano’s head was turned to face his 
executioners. It was a moment of defiance captured by chance- it appeared that Ciano 
                                                          
11. MacGregor Knox, Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy 
and Nazi Germany (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 142. 
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looked death in the face and by doing so challenged his label as a traitor. The photo fixed 
a moment, but one open to malleable and far-ranging interpretation  
Ciano was an individual torn between love of country and love of leader, and this 
tormented him daily. Ciano was not strong enough to refute Mussolini or abdicate his 
position as Foreign Minister, nor was he able to oppose Mussolini with conviction in 
1943. Ciano was not inherently good nor was he inherently evil, but he straddled those 
extremes. While some pity Ciano and others detest him, it is hard not to be intrigued by 
the elaborate, and often contradictory, nature of his character. 
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Chapter One 
Changing the “map of the world”12  
 
Introduction 
 Fascism does not, generally speaking, believe in the possibility or utility of perpetual 
peace. […] War alone keys up all human energies to their maximum tension and sets the 
seal of nobility on those peoples who have the courage to face it.13  
  
 The striking “ ‘parallelism’ ”14 between the political aims of the Nazi and fascist 
regimes was made evident starting from their collaboration in the Abyssinian Crisis 
(1935-1936), and further solidified after the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). “It was only 
natural that at a given moment contacts were established to co-ordinate the action of the 
two countries, which were aiming at the same goal, and which found themselves up 
against the same opposition and coalition of common adversaries”15 remarked one 
international news bulletin in December 1939. The bond between Hitler and Mussolini 
was a menacing force with which to reckon. 
There were many Italian diplomats, however, that despised Italy’s partnership 
with the Third Reich. Ciano was among them. Over a series of pertinent historical 
moments leading up to the Second World War, Ciano’s attitude towards Germany 
permanently altered- Hitler, whom he once believed to be a respectable dictator who 
could assist Italy with her hope of Mediterranean domination now appeared to him as a 
deceitful, malicious individual whose political gambles would significantly weaken the 
                                                          
12. Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, ed. by Malcolm Muggeridge, translated by Stuart Hood (London: 
Odhams Press Limited, 1948), 246. 
13. Mussolini, The Doctrine of Fascism, 19 
14. “Count Ciano’s Speech of December 16,” Bulletin of International News 16, no. 26 
(December 30, 1939): 12. 
15. “Count Ciano’s Speech of December 16,” 12. 
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fascist regime. Hitler’s dismissal of the 1938 Munich Pact, the signing of the Pact of 
Steel in May 1939, the Salzburg Meeting between Ciano and German Foreign Minister 
Joachim Ribbentrop in August 1939 and finally, Hitler’s invasion of Poland in September 
1939 were key events that fueled Ciano’s disillusionment with the Axis partnership.  
 The formidable Fascist-Nazi alliance not only altered Ciano’s outlook on 
Germany. It also changed his opinion of Mussolini’s political decisions; and although the 
Italian Foreign Minister revered the Duce and did not physically oppose his desire for 
war, there was a noticeable rift between Mussolini and his son-in-law that worsened with 
the coming years.  
  
An Inkling of Doubt 
 
On the twenty-fourth of September 1937, Mussolini and Ciano embarked on a 
five-day trip to Berlin to sign the October Protocols, a secret Italian-German alliance. On 
September twenty-ninth, Ciano wrote:  
the Duce’s presence in Germany has popularized friendship for Fascism- I dare 
not yet say for Italy. […] Will the solidarity between the two régimes suffice to 
form a real bond of union between two peoples drawn in opposite directions by 
race, culture, religion, and tastes? No one can accuse me of being hostile to the 
pro-German policy. I initiated it myself. But should we, I wonder, regard 
Germany as a goal, or rather as a field for manoeuvre? The incidents of the last 
few days and above all Mussolini’s fidelity to his political allegiance make me 
incline towards the first alternative. But may not events develop in such a way as 
to separate our two peoples once again?16  
                                                          
16. Ciano, Hidden Diary 1937-1938, 16.  
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Although it was done clandestinely, the October Protocols, building off of the 1936 
Rome-Berlin Axis, which Ciano described as “a force to reckon with,”17 reinforced the 
maturation of an Italian-German partnership. What is pertinent here is not the signing of 
the protocols, which bore little significance until the fabrication of the Pact of Steel, but 
rather Ciano’s articulation of these events. Ciano’s prose reflects an immediate 
antagonism to the growing bond between the two European powers, an omen that would 
prove true in Italian social and political circles with the formation of the Axis alliance. 
More remarkable is the difference between Mussolini and Ciano’s interpretations of the 
event. The Duce “declared that, in his opinion, it represents the first basic gesture which 
will lead to a much closer understanding of a political and military nature between the 
three powers.”18 Mussolini’s statement, unlike Ciano’s, is not overshadowed by an 
inkling of doubt. Although subtle, it foreshadows the beginning of a political break 
between Ciano and Mussolini. While Ciano acknowledged his own support in forming 
the alliance, there are subtle undertones that suggest he recognized the possible fractures 
that may have arisen from it.   
 During his early years in office, Galeazzo’s entries emanated confidence and a 
sure optimism of Italy’s ever-growing alliance with Germany. On November 6, 1937 
Italy, Japan and Germany signed the Tripartite Pact, which aligned the three nations 
against the threat of communism and Great Britain. Ciano’s enthusiasm is evident: “Italy 
has broken out of her isolation: she is in the centre of the most formidable political and 
military combination which has ever existed.”19 Mussolini yearned to lead Italy on a path 
of glory and triumph and he believed that the way to do this was align with Germany, a 
                                                          
17. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937-1938, 16.   
18. Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, 142. 
19. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937-1938, 29. 
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country, like Italy, driven by motives of imperialistic glory. Ciano supported this 
ideology, but as long as Italy maintained political power and control. 
According to one international news bulletin published by the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs dating October 2, 1937, Italy was extremely bitter over the outcome 
of World War One and her lack of reparations at the Paris Peace Conference. “This 
feeling of dissatisfaction was translated into diplomatic action by Signor Mussolini” in 
the shape of a partnership with Germany. The Duce was determined “to shape his foreign 
policy as to make Italy’s influence felt in Europe and thus to win for her that place in the 
affairs of Europe and the world in which he claimed to be her right.”20 Ciano, too, 
recognized the importance of Italian redemption, and thus resolvedly spoke of an alliance 
with Germany during the early years of 1937. He professed that it was necessary for the 
fascist regime to partner with the Third Reich “in order to break through the crust which 
is stifling the energy and the aspirations of the young nations.”21  In other words, the 
Italo-German alliance would lift Italy from the post-war injustices and depravations 
placed upon her. 
Despite Ciano’s sense of commitment to the alliance, as evidenced in his diary 
entries throughout late 1937 and into 1938, the Foreign Minister also constantly second-
guessed Hitler’s loyalty to Mussolini. This hesitancy was also felt among many leading 
members of the Corpo Diplomatico. On December 12, 1937 Ciano met with Grandi and 
they both expressed their desire to reach an understanding with London:  
                                                          
20. S.A.H, “Signor Mussolini in Germany,” Bulletin of International News 14, no. 7 (Oct. 2, 
1937): 3. 
21. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937-1938, 28-29. 
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Talk with Grandi. I tried to cheer him up, as he was rather worried. He sees no 
hope of an understanding with London. I told him that on the contrary I am just as 
optimistic about one as I was before […] Naturally I too prefer an agreement with 
London. Though I fully agree with the Duce that on the historical plane a conflict 
between Italy and Great Britain is inevitable.22  
While Ciano and Grandi both understood the importance of establishing a partnership 
with London, Ciano believed in Mussolini’s premonition that it would take a long time to 
fully develop. More importantly, this statement highlights the contradictory nature of 
Ciano’s personality, a quality that carried with him for the rest of his political career. 
While Ciano expressed his desire to partner with Great Britain, he immediately turned 
back on his word and convinced himself that a clash between the two countries was 
unavoidable. Even at an early stage Ciano was not only indecisive, but also confused 
about his opinions on Italy’s position in the international political arena.  
In some respect, the diary entry reflected Ciano’s subtle realization that an 
alliance with Germany might be a more natural course on which Italy could embark. 
Tensions between Italy and Britain had been broiling for some time. In a letter from 
Grandi to Ciano a year prior, on November 6, 1936, Grandi already started to articulate 
the hostility forming between the two nations: “The close Italo-German understanding 
[…] is the highest achievement of the DUCE’s foreign policy,” Grandi expressed. And it 
“is at present the subject of constant anxiety and thought among those who direct British 
policy.”23 Grandi went further to state that “British diplomacy, it is clear, wants to fight 
ITALY and GERMANY one at a time, at present on the field of diplomacy and 
                                                          
22. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937-1938, 43. 
23. Dino Grandi, “Letter from Dino Grandi, Italian ambassador in London, to Galeazzo Ciano, 
Foreign Minister and Mussolini’s son-in-law, 6 November 1936, on Italian-German relations,” Heroes & 
Villains, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/heroesvillains/g3/cs3/g3cs3s6a.htm. 
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politics.”24 An alliance between Germany and Italy threatened the security of Great 
Britain and she hoped that negotiations with Italy could prevent its formation.  
There were Italian diplomats who, unlike Ciano at this time, had a hard time 
accepting the Italo-German alliance during 1937. Though fascist officials revered the 
Duce, they did not revere his political decisions, and 
By 1937 a “fronde” [mimicking the French civil war from 1650 to 1653] had 
formed within the Grand Council. The group included [Balbo, along with] two of 
Balbo’s closest personal friends, Federzoni and Bottai, as well as two of his 
fellow quadrumvirs, De Vecchi and De Bono. Dino Grandi, Balbo’s old comrade 
from his days as a squadrista, and Alberto De Stefani, the economist and former 
finance minister, completed the group.25  
The “fronde” was unsuccessful at changing Mussolini’s policies; however, its formation 
sheds light on the cracks and divisions already forming within pre-war Italy. Resistance 
such as this tainted the regime, and slowly ate away at its core foundation. 
 By early 1938, Ciano’s attitude towards Germany and the major political bounds 
she was making began to shift. Germanic power continued to increase and it posed a 
major threat to the security of her neighboring nations, Hungary, Austria, Poland, and 
what are today the Czech and Slovak Republics. As reflected in Ciano’s diaries 
throughout this period, the Foreign Minister’s views of Germany were in constant 
oscillation: on February 5th, Ciano optimistically noted that Hitler was “making rapid 
strides towards total nazification” which would prove beneficial to strengthening the 
                                                          
24. Dino Grandi, “Letter from Dino Grandi, Italian ambassador in London, to Galeazzo Ciano, 
Foreign Minister and Mussolini’s son-in-law, 6 November 1936, on Italian-German relations.” 
25. Claudio G. Segrè, Italo Balbo: A Fascist Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 
334. Italo Balbo was Marshal of the Italian Air Force; Luigi Federzoni was President of the Senate and 
President of the Royal Academy of Italy; Giuseppe Bottai was the Italian Minister of Education; Cesare 
Maria de Vecchi was an Italian politician, soldier and colonial administrator; Emilio De Bono was an 
Italian General and Marshal; and Dino Grandi was the President of Chamber of Fasci and Corporations; All 
seven men, including Alberto De Stefani, were members of the fascist Grand Council. 
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Axis.26 Although excited by Germany’s growing power, Ciano expressed another bout of 
hesitation just a few days later on February 13th after receiving a report on the Austro-
German agreement made between Hitler and Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg 
stating the impending Nazification of Austria.27 This was the first moment when the 
political divergences between Ciano and Mussolini became blatantly noticeable- the 
former hoping to delay German action for as long as possible, and the latter 
enthusiastically supporting a German takeover.  
On March 11, 1938 the Austrian plebiscite failed and by March 12th, Austria was 
annexed into the Third Reich- Germany was well on her way to becoming the mightiest 
nation in Europe. Despite Ciano’s distaste, he did not openly protest Mussolini’s desires 
to strengthen ties with Germany. “When the Anschluss came up for discussion before the 
Grand Council, Balbo was the only member who opposed Mussolini’s decision to accept 
the annexation. Balbo fears for Trieste and criticizes the proceedings of the Germans, 
Ciano remarked.”28 After his protests were unsuccessful, Balbo realized that his efforts to 
oppose the Duce were futile and he stopped protesting. Although wary of the event, none 
of the members of the diplomatic corps, Ciano included, openly spoke out against 
Mussolini’s acceptance of the Anschluss. This not only revealed a great deal about the 
political relationship between Ciano and Mussolini, but also about the inner-workings of 
Italian diplomacy at this time. The Duce was more important than Italy- Mussolini had to 
be appeased at any cost. 
                                                          
26. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937-1938, 70. 
27. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937-1938, 74. 
28. Segré, Italo Balbo: A Fascist Life, 357. 
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Tensions over the Anschluss soon boiled over to the modern day Czech and 
Slovak Republics, and Italy became concerned that Germany intended to extend her 
influence throughout the area and possibly Poland as well. The diaries shed light on an 
Italian regime overwrought with anxiety, alternating between Germany and Great Britain 
and desperately trying to understand Hitler’s objectives. “[T]hey will, however, have to 
let us know their real intentions,” Ciano wrote, “do they want to proceed to the 
disintegration of Czechoslovakia or are they satisfied with a system of regional 
autonomy?”29 Hitler’s political and military ambiguity left Italy feeling unsettled and 
vulnerable, but Ciano was confident that after Ribbentrop’s visit to Rome, Germany 
would choose the latter of the two; many others, however, did not share this positive 
outlook and were overwhelmed with contempt. “A brief talk with Balbo,” Ciano penned, 
“[he is] Sour and hostile to everything. He spoke ill of the Germans, defended the Jews, 
[and] attacked Starace.”30  Despite their frustration, members of the Corpo Diplomatico 
believed their efforts to change Mussolini’s political mindset were useless. 
 Ciano’s diaries reveal that by September, members of the fascist regime, 
including Mussolini, recognized Italy’s subordinate position to Germany: “The Duce is 
disturbed by the fact that the Germans are letting us know almost nothing of their 
programme with regard to Czechoslovakia. […] It is clear that the Germans do not want 
to let us into the game. That leaves us the most complete liberty of action in any 
eventuality.”31 Although there was resonating hope of a potential development of an 
Anglo-Italian partnership, which would ultimately prevent Italy from finalizing an 
                                                          
29. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937-1938, 121. 
30. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937-1938, 128. 
31. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937-1938, 149-150. 
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alliance with Germany, Mussolini was never wedded to the idea and his feelings on the 
subject constantly changed. The Czech crisis was yet another incident that increased the 
Duce’s avid support for Hitler: “Benito Mussolini, who, in a series of speeches begun on 
September 18th, had been pouring forth a torrent of abuse of the Czechs, [and] support for 
Hitler.”32  
 The Munich Conference was the light of hope in this time of unease, and it was 
also an opportunity for the Duce to act as a great Italian conciliator and bestow peace 
upon Europe.33 The Conference, Richard Lamb contends, allowed Italy to keep both 
political doors open, that of Germany and that of Great Britain.34 This is highly 
debatable. Some historians, like Renzo De Felice, agree with Lamb and maintain that 
Mussolini and Ciano wanted to preserve an alliance with both Germany and Great 
Britain; while other historians, like Denis Mack Smith, claim that Mussolini, unlike 
Ciano, was quietly pro-German all along.35 Nonetheless, the conference did wonders for 
Mussolini’s image as an agent of peace,36 and on September 29, 1938 Great Britain, 
France, Italy and Germany met in hopes of discovering a solution to the ongoing problem 
of the Sudetenland and the present day Czech and Slovak Republics.  
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Interpretations of the event vary. From a German perspective, Mussolini was 
intimidated by Hitler’s presence, while a French source contended that Hitler greatly 
admired and imitated the Duce.37 Nonetheless,  
The two Caesars and their aides were in great fettle; Hitler with the swagger of a 
conqueror, Mussolini ‘cocky as a rooster’, Goring obesely gloating. This was their 
day and they knew it, and, while they preserved a certain decent modicum of 
reserve in the presence of their French and British colleagues, among themselves 
they did not hide their contempt for these champions of Western Democracy. In 
reality the Munich Conference was but a ceremony. Its very existence meant that 
in all essentials Hitler had won his demands.38  
On the morning of September 30, 1938 at half past two, the Munich Agreement was 
signed. According to its stipulations, the Sudetenland was relinquished to Germany- the 
territory was divided into four zones for organizational purposes and evacuations lasted 
from October 1st through the 7th. The agreement also addressed the Third Reich’s 
occupancy of additional German territory outside the Sudetenland, and it determined 
what areas would hold plebiscites and which would be transferred without. 
The conference at Munich, although intended to check German power, did just the 
opposite: it instilled Hitler with a new sense of courage for he realized that no nation 
would actively oppose his goals for European domination. “The Pact of Munich is 
signed, wrote Jodl in his diary, with mingled relief and satisfaction, Czechoslovakia as a 
Power is out…The genius of the Fuhrer and his determination not to shun even a World 
War have again won victory without the use of force.”39 In actuality,  
By letting Germany take Austria and make what was left of Czechoslovakia into a 
virtual German protectorate, Mussolini gratuitously helped the German drive into 
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the Balkans and along the Danube, two areas that he had once marked out for 
himself: and all without receiving anything in exchange.40  
Within a week of signing, all restrictions placed on Germany were lifted and 
Czechoslovakia was forced to cede almost 11,000 square miles to Germany, 
consequently losing a population of 2,800,000 Sudeten Germans and 800,000 Czechs.41 
Czechoslovakia’s economic losses were staggering as well.42 The Munich Agreement 
planted a seed of doubt into the heads of many fascist officials, including Ciano, over the 
impending alliance with Germany, and it set the stage for many tumultuous years to 
come. “Munich marked the moment when the Third Reich took over from the British, the 
French and the League of Nations as regional arbiter of central Europe.”43 Hitler made it 
clear that his regime was the most powerful in Europe.  
John W. Wheeler-Bennett argues that, “Munich only stands as a milestone 
between the years which the locusts had eaten and the months which they were about to 
devour.”44 The Germans were the locusts and devour they did. The following year on 
March 12, 1939, Hitler, in complete disregard of the Munich Agreement and without 
informing Mussolini first, ordered troops to march over the Czech border and into 
Prague. Consequently, the independent state of what is now the Czech and Slovak 
Republics disappeared.45 In response, Ciano questioned Mussolini’s commitment to the 
Italian-German alliance. On March 15, 1939 Ciano penned: “What weight can be given 
in the future to those declarations and promises which concern us more directly? It is 
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useless to deny that all this concerns and humiliates the Italian people.”46 And later on 
March 19th Ciano confessed that “The events of the last few days have reversed my 
opinion of the Führer and of Germany; he, too, is unfaithful and treacherous and we 
cannot carry on policy with him.”47 Hitler’s betrayal of the Munich Pact set off the initial 
spark of discontent within Ciano, which only grew as tensions throughout Europe 
escalated. It is important to recognize, however, that although Ciano’s contempt and 
unease for the partnership with Germany increased, he did not speak out against 
Mussolini’s decisions. 
 
“[T]he pact of blood”48 
 Germany’s invasion of the present Czech and Slovak Republics on March 14, 
1939 left fascist officials dumbfounded; they did not know the extent to which Germany 
could be trusted. Hitler completely disregarded the Munich Pact and in doing so, slighted 
Italy. The Duce appeared to be one of the few, if not the only one, who argued for the 
continuation of Italian allegiance to Hitler. “[A]t the Grand Council meeting of March 21, 
in a speech that Ciano described as argumentative, logical, cold, and heroic, the Duce 
called for uncompromising loyalty to the Axis. De Bono and Balbo jeered, and Balbo 
retorted, You are licking Germany’s boots.”49 Ciano said nothing to counteract 
Mussolini, and instead directed his anger towards Balbo and De Bono- he violently 
rejected their statements and “proved to them that Mussolini’s policies had always been 
those of a proud man. The Duce approved of what I had done, and told me that Balbo will 
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always remain […] democratic swine.”50 Here it is obvious that despite the resonances of 
discontent Ciano remained loyal to Mussolini although he, too, wanted to align with 
Great Britain. The diary entry highlights one of the central inconsistencies of Ciano’s 
character- although Ciano described Mussolini’s speech as cold and argumentative, he 
also labeled it as heroic and logical. This implied that he respected the Duce, and this 
respect continued to override his objections to the Axis alliance. Ciano was unable to 
make a complete physical and emotional break from Mussolini until 1943. In four years 
time, many members of the diplomatic corps collaborated to strip the Duce of military 
power. Only with the support of others would Ciano gain confidence to oppose 
Mussolini. 
The diaries indicate that throughout March 1939, Mussolini “did not seem to 
attach great importance to”51 Hitler’s dismissal of the Munich Pact, and he continued to 
maintain “that what Germany has done is logical and that we would have acted similarly 
under like circumstances.”52 Mussolini, most likely propelled by personal pride and fear 
of Hitler’s wrath, refused to turn against Germany. “We cannot change politics,” he 
declared, “because after all we are not prostitutes.”53  
Most members of the Corpo Diplomatico disagreed with Mussolini’s decision, 
Ciano included, and they continued to push for an alliance with Great Britain. But no one 
was actively defiant. Despite the threat of Italy succumbing to Hitler’s control, men like 
“Balbo chose to stay aboard, bail, and from time to time shout advice to a deaf captain.”54  
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“Talk to the boss about it?” asked De Bono, “Never. Mine would be a solitary voice. 
Everyone or nearly everyone thinks like me, but who has the courage to speak up?”55 
Bastianini considered opposing Mussolini, but realized the complicities of such an act, 
complicities that arose from  
a residual loyalty to the man [Mussolini], a sense of patriotism, and a faint hope 
that somehow in the end, the Duce’s ‘genius’ would save Italy from disaster.  ‘We 
love him with that love that nourishes itself on admiration and suffering. We stand 
beside him and do our duty as Italians,’ wrote Bastianini and so summed up the 
choice that virtually every major gerarca-including Balbo-made. In the name of 
loyalty, patriotism, and duty, Italy went down to disaster.56  
Ciano exemplified the same level of commitment to Mussolini and as Edda reflects, he 
“nourished no more illusions. But he never thought of abandoning my father, that is to 
say, of resigning.”57 The Corpo Diplomatico had a warped sense of duty, pledging 
allegiance to a man who was leading Italy on a path of destruction. This extreme sense of 
piety significantly weakened the core Fascisti by preventing them from making sensible 
decisions on a political, militaristic and social level.    
 While Mussolini was enticed by the prospect of glory, fame and power to join 
Germany and her push for war, he recognized that Italy was still not militaristically ready 
for battle and thus he, largely listening to Ciano’s concerns, formulated the idea of a 
peace conference to settle the controversy over the Polish city of Danzig. On May 6th and 
7th, 1939, Ciano ventured to Milan where he met with the German Foreign Minister, 
Joachim von Ribbentrop, to discuss Mussolini’s proposal. To Ciano’s dismay, 
Ribbentrop instantly made it clear that Hitler opposed the idea of a conference for two 
reasons: firstly, it would place Germany and Italy in a “numerically inferior” position 
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against France, England and Poland. Secondly, it would achieve nothing positive but only 
“aggravate the Poles hysterical state of mind.”58 Ribbentrop informed Ciano that 
Germany soon needed Danzig and the highway across the Corridor,59 and a military and 
political alliance between Italy and Germany would only frighten France and Britain, 
thus enabling Germany to invade Poland and quickly end the war. 60 “Germany, too, is 
convinced of the necessity for a period of peace,” Ribbentrop stated reassuringly, “which 
should not be less than four or five years.”61 Ciano, although skeptical at the beginning of 
the meeting, fell for Ribbentrop’s act and departed with a restored feeling of confidence 
in the partnership, which he transmitted to Mussolini upon returning to Rome.   
Ciano was certain that Italian diplomacy halted any deceitful maneuvers on behalf 
of the Third Reich,62 while Mussolini deluded himself with the hope that if Germany did 
take Poland it would be done effortlessly and without a fight.63 Mussolini also secretly 
desired that in return for Poland, Germany would grant Italy “a freehand in the 
Balkans”64 from which she could invade Turkey, Greece and even Switzerland or 
Romania.65 Instilled with a hollowed sense of security, Mussolini agreed to solidify 
relations with Nazi Germany.  
 On May 22, 1939, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop and Count Galeazzo Ciano 
signed the Italo-German Military Pact, dubbed the Pact of Steel, in Berlin. It was an 
alliance intended by “the German and Italian peoples […] to stand side by side and with 
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united strength to render secure their space for living […] in the midst of a world of 
unrest and disintegration.”66 The pact guaranteed the continuation of Italian-German 
cooperation for a period of ten years and it ensured that war would not ensue for at least 
another three years.67 “Nine days earlier, during the negotiations, Ciano had remarked, I 
have never read such a pact. It contains some real dynamite.”68  
 Despite Ciano’s praise for the alliance, there were many members of the Corpo 
Diplomatico who recognized the dangers of the pact and of Mussolini’s resulting 
‘appeasement.’ To begin with, a majority of Mussolini’s ambassadors abroad had no idea 
what the Duce’s intentions or political aims were, or whether he desired peace or war.69 
“Some of the wiser and better informed gerarchi now had further evidence that fascist 
policy had been entirely wrong, because Hitler had managed to deceive Italy into 
becoming his accomplice in a highly dangerous adventure.”70 Arguably, Ciano 
recognized the dangers of signing such a pact; however, as mentioned above, he admired 
Mussolini and thus foolishly clung to his faith that the pact would benefit Italy. Hitler’s 
actions in the following months, however, replaced Ciano’s ignorant self-assurance with 
upset and despair. Even then Ciano and the other fascist government officials who 
yearned to openly denounce the alliance were deterred from doing so. “[T]he few brave 
enough to hint as much to Mussolini were silenced by shouted obscenities or dismissed 
from their posts” and thus exemplified the unfortunate fate of whoever spoke against the 
Duce.71 Ciano was part of the majority of fascist diplomats who learned to remain silent. 
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It was clear that Mussolini refused to listen to anyone, affirming to his belief that he was 
the only diplomatic professional.72  
 The Pact of Steel was a dangerous undertaking for another reason as well; there 
was no clause included in the alliance that called for a meeting between the two dictators 
before any action was taken and this was a major threat unrecognized by Italy.73 
Unbeknownst to Ciano or Mussolini, Germany was seeking a détente with Russia while 
the pact was signed, and they were technically within complete legal rights to do so.74 
Additionally, it was not a defensive pact and consequently if Germany chose to declare 
war on Poland, Italy was forced to follow.75  
In a previous meeting between the Duce and Ribbentrop on October 28, 1938 it 
was evident that Mussolini blindly, and foolishly, trusted Germany to fulfill her 
obligations of a proper alliance to Italy:  
between Italy and Germany there exist no written pacts […] there is a solidarity of 
regime, as well as mutual interest in helping each other, even if the undertaking is 
not recognised in an official document. The attitude of Italy has been clear in the 
past and will always be so, even should the fate of the two empires be at stake.76  
 
The Duce liked the idea of an alliance, but not the finicky details of its terms and 
conditions77 and thus allowed the Germans to formulate the document. 78 Ciano did not to 
suggest anything otherwise. The Germans, fully aware of Mussolini and Ciano’s 
placidity, cleverly manipulated the provisos for their personal benefit. The Pact of Steel 
was as much the fault of Ciano’s as it was Mussolini’s. “Mussolini rushed into it 
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irresponsibly, and Ciano’s diplomacy was ham-fisted.”79 It made little sense that the 
Italian Foreign Minister, who already expressed concern over the trustworthiness of the 
Third Reich, relied on Hitler to formulate the alliance. It alludes to Ciano’s confidence in 
the Duce, and perhaps in fate itself, that the pact would work to Italy’s favor. Mussolini 
nor Ciano displayed any political tact, and it marked a huge failure in Italian history.  
By mid-summer of 1939, tensions were high between England and Italy over the 
signing of the pact, and over Germany’s resolve to take Danzig. In a conversation 
between Ciano and Sir Percy Loraine on July 21, 1939, Loraine recalled that the Italian 
Foreign Minister maintained that neither Germany nor Italy wanted war, and that he was 
personally looking forward to peace.80 Ciano spoke preemptively, perhaps letting his own 
hope for peace cloud his judgment of the present European situation. Just six days after, 
on July 27, Hitler, without warning Mussolini or Ciano, ordered troops to take Danzig.81 
Both men were shocked.  Mussolini, in a desire to diffuse the situation, wanted Ciano to 
meet with Ribbentrop and again propose a European Conference to enable Hitler to 
peacefully obtain Danzig.  The meeting was set for August 11th at Salzburg and though 
Ciano went into it with good intent, the meeting revealed to the Foreign Minister the 
deceptive nature of the Third Reich and permanently altered his once positive opinion of 
the Italo-German alliance.  
 The meeting lasted ten hours in total, and throughout Ribbentrop repeatedly 
affirmed Hitler’s intent to destroy Poland. There would be no room for compromise 
despite Ciano’s attempts to speak to the Reich’s foreign minister with the “utmost 
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frankness”82 of the devastation another European war would render. Ciano’s frustration 
with Germany appears in his records of the meeting: 
I must add that he [Ribbentrop] gives an impression of an unreasonable, obstinate 
determination to bring about this conflict. […] I several times stated our point of 
view. I showed that everything in present European politics leads one to consider 
armed intervention by France and England inevitable together with the support or 
the direct aid of numerous other countries. It was useless. Ribbentrop takes refuge 
in the negative pure and simple, saying that his information and above all his 
psychological knowledge of England make him certain that any armed British 
intervention is ruled out.83 
Ciano believed that the meeting was an opportunity to achieve peace, and thus was 
disheartened by Germany’s headstrong desire for violence. It became clear to the Italian 
Foreign Minister that Europe would become prey to German barbarity. The following 
day Ciano met with Hitler who revealed his intentions to “liquidate the Polish situation 
by 15 October.”84 According to Hitler, the Poles “sat like misers on their heaps of gold, 
wallowing drunkenly in their riches without being able to put them to productive use. The 
Western democracies were guided by the desire to dominate the world and did not regard 
Germany and Italy as equals.”85 The Third Reich would not stand for these ‘injustices’ 
any longer- the Polish ‘threat’ needed to be suppressed. Hitler believed that it would be a 
quick and easy development, and that France and Britain would not intervene due to their 
insufficient armaments.86  
Ciano disagreed, arguing that the war could not be localized and Italy was not 
prepared to fight; but his attempts met with no success. Hitler and Ribbentrop worked to 
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appease Ciano, and reassured him that Britain and Russia would not take part and thus 
Italy would not have to fight. They even promised Italy claims to Greece and 
Yugoslavia.87 According to Denis Mack Smith, “At this wonderful news, Ciano’s doubts 
disappeared and he accepted that the German analysis of the situation must be right. He 
therefore failed to make the point that Hitler, by refusing to consult or inform Rome, had 
broken the terms of their alliance.”88 Ciano exhibited the same qualities of submission in 
the presence of the Fuehrer as he did with Mussolini. Interestingly, Ciano’s forceful 
declarations to terminate the Italo-German partnership began, not during the meeting, but 
after it’s completion when Ciano was back in Rome.  
To add salt to the wound, a telegram from the German Embassy in Moscow 
announcing Russia’s agreement to send a political negotiator to Moscow from Berlin 
interrupted Ciano’s conversation with the Fuehrer. “Hitler was triumphant.”89 The 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, what Mark Mazower called “the greatest diplomatic coup” of 
Hitler’s career90 and what Ribbentrop labeled as his utmost diplomatic achievement,91 
was made in complete secrecy, a move on Germany’s behalf that, according to Ciano, 
confirmed Hitler’s untrustworthiness. “[T]he so closely guarded secrecy on the progress 
of these negotiations,” Ciano bitterly admitted, “is difficult to reconcile with the terms of 
our alliance and with the complete loyalty we have shown towards Germany.”92  
  Before his departure, Hitler and Ribbentrop confirmed that no press statement 
about the meeting would be released; but on his way back to Rome, Ciano caught wind 
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that Ribbentrop issued a report saying Italy was in complete agreement with Germany 
and that she would always be on her side.93 From that moment on, “Relations between 
Ciano and Ribbentrop became icy, and thenceforward Ciano was a convinced anti-
Nazi.”94 “That man Ribbentrop is a sinister being,” Ciano wrote in his diary, “and his 
influence on events is extremely dangerous.”95 After the Salzburg meeting, Ciano 
realized that Italy’s role in the Axis partnership was diminishing, thus he became alarmed 
and angered by Hitler’s dealings. Ciano arrived in Rome with a resolute determination to 
arouse in Mussolini any anti-German sentiment possible. To Ciano’s dismay, Mussolini 
refused to acknowledge the severity of the situation. On August 21st, Ciano penned: 
When I entered the room Mussolini confirmed his decision to go along with the 
Germans. ‘You, Duce, cannot and must not do it. The loyalty with which I have 
served you in carrying out the policy of the Axis warrants my speaking clearly to 
you now. I went to Salzburg in order to adopt a common line of action. I found 
myself face to face with a diktat. The Germans, not ourselves, have betrayed the 
alliance in which we were to have been partners, and not servants. Tear up the 
pact. Throw it in Hitler’s face and Europe will recognize in you the natural leader 
of the anti-German crusade.’ […] He [Mussolini] does not want the Axis to 
collapse for the time being, but if it should I would not be the one to weep over 
it.96  
There were moments when Ciano’s concerns resonated with Mussolini, yet the Duce 
never broke ties with Hitler. He remained committed to the Third Reich.  
 The Salzburg Meeting marked a definitive turning point in Ciano’s attitude 
towards Germany- not only did Ciano deem Hitler untrustworthy, but he also vowed to 
speak out against these injustices and inform Mussolini of his true opinion of Germany. It 
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is crucial to recognize that the change in Ciano’s attitude was not sparked by his steadily 
growing doubt in Mussolini’s politics. Rather,  
that it was sudden, and, as such, in complete accordance with Ciano’s 
characteristic approach to diplomacy. As we have seen, Ciano was little inclined 
to base his policy on considerations of permanent and underlying forces and 
interests. He approached policy in terms of personality, relying heavily upon his 
judgment of the leading figures of other countries. Thus, Ribbentrop’s arrogant 
announcement of Germany’s approaching military action against Poland, which 
revealed that the Italians had been trapped and overplayed, was a blow to Ciano’s 
pride. He must have regarded it as quite a personal failure of his diplomacy, and 
turned now with vehemence against those whom he had misjudged.97 
Hitler and Ribbentrop undermined Mussolini’s diplomacy and Ciano’s diplomatic tact.  
They challenged Ciano’s aptitude as an Italian attaché, which Ciano interpreted as a 
direct insult to his pride. The drastic change in Ciano’s view of Germany generated from 
Germany’s sudden attack on his character, not from an annoyance with Mussolini and his 
unwise political decisions.  
Ciano’s diaries describe concerns emitted by men such as Ambassador Attolico, 
who forewarned of impending German sedition.98 The Germans “are possessed by the 
demon of destruction,”99 wrote Ciano; and he did not hesitate to share these feelings with 
Mussolini, however he met with no luck. “At first he agreed with me, Ciano remembered. 
Then he said that honour compelled him to march with Germany. Finally he said that he 
wanted his part of the booty.”100 Mussolini “fears Hitler’s rage,” Ciano noted in 
recognition that the Duce’s loyalty to Germany could not be swayed. “All this makes him 
nervous and disturbed. My suggestions are given short shrift […] and he refuses to be 
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influenced by me.”101 On August 23rd, Stalin cancelled negotiations with France and 
Britain and signed a non-intervention pact with Germany. Mussolini was furious.102 
Despite his anger, the Duce still wanted to assist Hitler with his conquest of Poland. “He 
fears the bitter judgment of the Germans, and wants to intervene at once,” Ciano 
penned.103 At one point it appeared that Ciano was able to calm Mussolini down and 
convince him to write a forceful letter to Hitler stating that Italy was “not ready to go to 
war.”104 In his letter, the Duce reiterated Italy’s military unpreparedness due to her 
involvement in the Abyssinian War and the Spanish Civil War; but Mussolini also 
congratulated Hitler on his success with the Nazi-Soviet Pact.105 “Mussolini sought to 
evade war without formally denouncing the Pact of Steel,”106 and he chose to praise 
Hitler’s underhanded maneuver. Ciano’s fight was now not simply aimed at the Fuehrer, 
but at the Duce as well.  
Germany’s dealings left a bad taste of deceit in the mouths of most Italian 
Diplomats. “The Nazi-Soviet Pact, with its betrayal of both the Pact of Steel and the very 
anti-bolshevik cornerstone of fascist ideology, outraged Balbo and Quilici.”107 Ciano 
dubbed the Germans as “treacherous and deceitful,” and he adamantly believed that “Any 
kind of alliance with them becomes a bad alliance in a little while.”108 The Nazi-Soviet 
Pact, as the diaries emphasized, was a “monstrous union” that was “anti-Roman and anti-
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Catholic.”109 Overall, it was “a return to barbarism, which it is our historic function to 
resist with every weapon and by every means.”110 Ciano’s diary entry for September 26th 
reveals a deep concern for Italy’s future well-being. It also stressed the feelings of despair 
that spread throughout fascist political circles. Hitler noticed the rising tensions and 
proclaimed that Mussolini’s existence was decisive to the effectiveness of the Italo-
German partnership. “If anything happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the alliance will no 
longer be certain. The Italian Court is fundamentally opposed to the Duce.”111 The Pact 
of Steel bound Italy to Germany’s side and signified that for the rest of the war she would 
be taken in tow whether she agreed with Hitler’s decisions or not. The Nazi-Soviet Pact 
was a further reminder of this truth. 
 
Operation Fall Weiss112 
 
The Salzburg meeting was a defining moment in Ciano’s relationship with 
Germany, and in his opinion of the ever-growing Italian-German partnership. “This is 
very serious,” Ciano solemnly wrote. “The situation which during the past few days had 
an undeniable clarity may become very obscure from one hour to the next.”113 Ciano 
went on to state:  
The thing that disturbs me most in his conversations is the tone in which he 
[Goering] described relations with Poland; it reminds me peculiarly of the same 
means used at other times for Austria and for Czechoslovakia. But the Germans 
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are mistaken if they think they can act in the same way; Poland will undoubtedly 
be overrun, but the Poles will not lay down their arms without a hard fight.114  
The threat to Poland was a major source of contention. An ominous cloud shrouds 
Ciano’s diary entries on the days leading up to the German invasion of Poland, and it is 
clear that the Italian Foreign Minister desperately wanted to negotiate with the Allies. On 
August 31st Ciano called  
Halifax by telephone to tell him that the Duce can intervene with Hitler only if he 
brings a fat prize: Danzig. Empty-handed he can do nothing. […] The sky is 
becoming darker and darker. […]  I see the Duce again. As a last resort, let us 
propose to France and Great Britain a conference for September 5, for the purpose 
of reviewing those clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which disturb European life. 
I warmly support the proposal, if for no other reason than because it will widen 
the distance between us and Hitler, who wants no conferences and has said so 
many times.115  
From what the diaries reveal, Ciano supported Great Britain’s cause at this time and his 
opposition to Germany was resolute.  
Despite Ciano’s preference for the Allies and their political ideology, it is 
important to distinguish between Ciano’s writing and his actions. Although Ciano wrote 
about his dislike of the Italo-German alliance and his desire to collaborate with Great 
Britain, he still did not resign from office or take other drastic measures to support his 
cause. The reasons for this are debatable. Perhaps Ciano did nothing to affirm of his 
loyalty to Mussolini and the regime; or perhaps he did not want to surrender his power 
and prestige. It was most likely a combination of both. Nonetheless, Ciano’s inability to 
actively oppose Mussolini was one of his most notable flaws as diplomat. 
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 At 4:30 a.m. on September 1, 1939, German troops crossed over the border into 
Poland and were ‘attacked’ by Polish officers. In actuality, the attack was entirely 
simulated: the Polish officers were really German criminals who, after ‘assaulting’ 
German soldiers, were brutally killed.116 World War Two was officially declared at 
eleven that same morning. Hitler had not informed Mussolini of his plans and once again 
the Duce, along with the men of the Corpo Diplomatico, were shocked. Fascist officials 
like Starace and Alfieri who once embraced the prospect of war, now firmly opposed 
it.117 They were completely disgusted with Germany’s behavior. The Duce continued to 
express full solidarity with Hitler. “The idea of joining the Germans attracts him,” 
Ciano’s diaries reveal, and no one could persuade him otherwise. Mussolini, knew, 
however, that Italy was still unprepared for war and wanted to call together a European 
Conference to peacefully negotiate. 118 Ciano fully supported the Duce’s decision, and 
was amazed when Hitler was willing to compromise.119 Unfortunately, Lord Halifx 
would not agree to such a meeting until German troops exited Polish territory. “The last 
note of hope has died,” Ciano dismally wrote.120 “Nothing can be done. I throw the 
proposal in the wastebasket without informing the Duce. […] I am not a military man. I 
do not know how the war will develop, but I know one thing- it will develop and it will 
be long, uncertain, and relentless.”121  
                                                          
116. Lamb, Mussolini as Diplomat: Il Duce’s Italy on the World Stage, 262. 
117. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, 136. 
118. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, 138. 
119. Lamb, Mussolini as Diplomat: Il Duce’s Italy on the World Stage, 263. Hitler never planned 
to negotiate. He had every intention of continuing the invasion, but wanted the delay to prevent Britain and 
France from intervening. Ciano had been duped. 
120. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, 137. 
121. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, 137. 
 37
 Due to Italy’s “disastrous”122 armament situation and unpreparedness for war, the 
Duce was forced to announce Italy’s non-belligerency on September 1st. According to 
Denis Mack Smith, “the word ‘neutral’ was un-fascist, [so] he [Mussolini] expertly 
coined the term ‘non-belligerent’ to disguise the stark truth.”123 Mussolini was humiliated 
by his inability to enter the war and fight alongside Germany, however his political 
cabinet, especially Ciano, approved of this decision: “The position of playing a neutral 
part in a Europe that is fighting or getting ready to fight humiliates him. […] The day will 
come when everybody will see the great advantages that non-belligerency has given 
Italy.”124  
Italy’s forced ‘nonbelligerence’ in September 1939 was thus not an example of 
Mussolini’s purported realism, but rather the establishment’s last victory over the 
regime’s revolutionary expansionism. Pope Pius XII and Badoglio, diplomats, 
industrialists, and King Emmanuel III, all coalesced behind Mussolini’s son-in-
law and foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, to hold back Mussolini and the Party 
enthusiasts.125  
Due to his familial connections, many fascists saw Ciano as the closest link to the Duce 
and they hoped the Foreign Minister could prevent Mussolini from entering the war on 
Germany’s side. It was a useless pursuit; Ciano had no greater sway over Mussolini’s 
political decisions than did anyone else. A noticeable rift formed between the minority 
who shared Mussolini’s mortification and supported entering the war as quickly as 
possible, and the majority who worked to prolong neutrality. The recordings of President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s foreign policy adviser, Sumner Welles, depict an awareness of the 
same political divisions in the fascist regime as expressed in the diaries.  
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After meeting with Ciano in the spring of 1940, Welles described the Italian 
Foreign Minister as incredibly anti-German and anti-war. “Count Ciano insisted that the 
Italian government had the deepest sympathy for the real Poles. […] No country, Count 
Ciano declared, would want to have Germany as a neighbor. Italy now has her as a 
neighbor and we must do the best we can to get on with her.”126 According to Welles, 
anti-German sentiment permeated throughout Italian political, military, religious and 
social circles. “The Italian General Staff was wholly antagonistic, and […] The newer 
and increasingly strong element in the Fascios, led by Ciano, Grandi, and Balbo, was 
strongly opposed,” observed Welles. “So was the Royal Family. The Church was openly 
against it […] and every man and woman with whom one could talk. Popular feeling was 
not pro-Ally, but it was anti-German.”127  
 Ciano did not conceal his hatred of Hitler and the Third Reich, especially 
throughout the closing months of 1939. On December 16, 1939 he gave a speech to the 
Chamber of Fascios in which he addressed Italian-German relations, the Munich Crisis, 
the Pact of Steel, the Russo-German Pact, and Italian non-belligerency. The speech was 
readily equipped with anti-German sentiment. “My speech had great success, even if 
everybody did not discern the subtle anti-German poison which permeated it,” Ciano 
reflected on December 16th.128 “They tell me that the German Ambassador listened to it 
in silence, and at times was not able to conceal his disappointment. Good.”129 First it was 
Russia, and then it was Poland-  “Everybody knows and understands that Germany has 
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betrayed us twice.”130 The speech was the first time that Ciano formerly proclaimed his 
dislike of Nazi Germany and his disproval of the Axis partnership to Mussolini, the 
fascist diplomatic corps, and to Hitler. Consequently, it solidified Ciano’s anti-German 
position for the rest of the war. This would eventually have major consequences in his 
political career and in his personal life.  
Mussolini’s attitude towards Germany constantly changed throughout the end of 
1939 and early 1940, and these variations are perfectly exemplified in a letter he wrote to 
Hitler on January 3, 1940 concerning Ciano’s speech. In the body of the letter, the Duce 
agreed with Ciano; however, at the end he contradictorily maintained Italy’s allegiance to 
the Third Reich and her desire to help Germany in any way possible.131 By 1940, 
Mussolini had given up on the prospect of peace and there was even an apparent change 
in Ciano’s personality- he “was still rebellious, but with less and less conviction.”132 
Italy’s predicament took a turn for the worse when Britain revealed that starting March 1, 
1940, she would halt all German ships carrying coal from Rotterdam to Italy.133 
Mussolini was outraged, and rejected all British attempts to negotiate-134 to partake in 
such discussions entailed turning his back on Germany, an act the Duce was not yet 
willing to commit. Hitler, aware of Mussolini’s emotional state, sent Ribbentrop to Rome 
on March 10, 1940 to try and persuade Italy to officially enter the war as Germany’s 
partner. “I dread the Duce’s contact with the Germans,” Ciano confided to his diary. “The 
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thought of war dominates him […] Inaction will […] go against the grain of his 
aggressive temperament.”135  
On March 18th, Mussolini and Hitler had a follow-up meeting at the Brenner Pass, 
which frightened Ciano: “the Duce is fascinated by Hitler, a fascination which involves 
something deeply rooted in his make-up. The Führer will get more out of the Duce than 
Ribbentrop was able to get.”136 Ciano’s premonition was correct. The Duce declared to 
Hitler that as soon as Germany made admirable gains in the west, Italy would join 
them.137 Ciano was aware that Hitler was baiting Mussolini by using Germany’s military 
strength to appeal to the Duce, who was consumed by thoughts of war and conquest.138  
The following month on April 9th, Hitler attacked Norway and Denmark then 
immediately sent four messages to Mussolini describing his success.139 The Duce was 
ecstatic- with each one of Hitler’s conquests Mussolini became more excited to fight 
alongside Germany. “I approve Hitler’s action wholeheartedly,” Mussolini confided to 
Ciano. “It is a gesture that can have incalculable results, and this is the way to win wars.  
The democracies have lost the race. I shall give orders to the press and to the Italian 
people to applaud this German action without reservation.”140 On May 10th Germany 
invaded Holland and Belgium and continued to experience outstanding success against 
the British and French.141 By May 30th Mussolini officially made up his mind for Italy to 
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enter the war. On June 1st, the King gave his approval. Ciano was at a loss and 
interestingly his diary entry does not express contempt for the king, but for Mussolini. 
Arguably, if King Emmanuel III had forbade the war, Mussolini would have maneuvered 
around it. 
 
Italy’s “ ‘hour of destiny’ ”142  
 
On June 10, 1940, Mussolini stood from his balcony overlooking Piazza Venezia, 
which brimmed with throngs of people who impatiently awaited Mussolini’s declaration 
of war.  “The news of the war does not surprise anyone and does not arouse very much 
enthusiasm.”143 Ciano wrote, echoing the feelings of many Italians who had become 
disenchanted with Mussolini and his pursuit for military excellence. As Welles 
recognized,  
If there was ever a case in modern history when a dictator plunged a great nation 
into a wholly unjustified and wholly unpopular military adventure, it was when 
Mussolini forced the Italian people into a war against their traditional friends, 
solely to serve the interests of a country which for generations they had both 
feared and hated.144  
In his diaries Ciano firmly maintained that neither he, nor any other members of the 
Corpo Diplomatico, had the ability to stop Mussolini and his decision to enter the war 
alongside Germany: “Badoglio wanted the Duce to procrastinate as usual, so as to have 
more time to prepare, but the die was cast, and Mussolini” itched “to get his fingers on 
the booty.”145 In his memoirs, Badoglio further reminisced about June 10th with an air of 
                                                          
142. Lamb, Mussolini as Diplomat: Il Duce’s Italy on the World Stage, 286. 
143. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, 264. 
144. Welles, The Time for Decision, 147. 
145. Lamb, Mussolini as Diplomat: Il Duce’s Italy on the World Stage, 278. 
 42
exasperation and despair: “I found myself in a corner of the room, feeling miserable. 
Ciano came up to me and said: Now it’s done. There is no time for recriminations, only 
for action. Pray heaven we have good luck.”146  
 Ten days after entering the war Mussolini, refusing to listen to the concerns of 
many fascist officials, attacked France. From the Duce’s point of view, Italy had been left 
out of the war for long enough and it was time to prove herself as Germany’s potent ally.  
Badoglio gave two reasons not to launch an attack: “The first was technical- our positions 
were purely defensive, as he knew, and it would take twenty-five days to go over to the 
offensive. The second was moral- the French army was disintegrating and the Germans 
had no need of our help to complete its destruction. […] This was the second clash which 
I had with Mussolini; the first had been over the declaration of war.”147 Ciano’s diaries 
echo this same belief, professing that  
The war has been won by Hitler without any active military participation on the 
part of Italy, and it is Hitler who will have the last word. This, naturally, disturbs 
and saddens him. His reflections on the Italian people, and, above all, on our 
armed forces, are extremely bitter this evening.148  
At this point, fascist officials were already predicting a German victory and knew that 
Italian ruin was inevitable. Achille Starace, upon returning from the Alpine front on June 
25th, a day after an armistice was signed between Italy and France, was bewildered by the 
number of men who were pointlessly dying in such a useless operation.  
This was one of the many military endeavors initiated by Mussolini to reinforce 
Italy’s prestige throughout Europe and the Mediterranean, especially in regards to her 
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main competitor, Germany. Most, if not all, of Mussolini’s wartime decisions germinated 
from his acute awareness that Hitler’s political and military supremacy was constantly 
increasing, and it was the Duce’s primary desire to outdo this supremacy. 
 Mussolini was undeterred by Italy’s weak and futile offensive against France and 
instead, two days after the French armistice, he turned his attention to Great Britain. 
Germany was planning an attack, known as ‘Operation Sea Lion,’149 on the British Isles 
and the Duce wanted to participate in order to show Hitler that Italy was well-equipped to 
fight. “I am ready to contribute ground forces and air forces and you know how much I 
desire to do so,” Mussolini proclaimed.150 Ciano, too, affirmed Mussolini’s desire to 
participate when he met with Hitler fourteen days later in Berlin. German military 
generals were horrified, and Goering, who was in command of the German Air Force, 
worried that Italy was not prepared for such an endeavor.151 He was right. When 
Germany began bombing London on September 7, 1940 (the Blitzkrieg lasted 57 days), 
Hitler allowed Italian planes to participate in what Mussolini referred to as a symbolic 
expression of Italo-German partnership. The results were catastrophic.152 The Italian 
planes were outdated and slow, and thus the German Air Force had to protect them from 
harm. It was an embarrassing and ignoble military endeavor that produced undeserved 
Italian losses, and, once again, tarnished Italy’s militaristic image in the eyes of the 
Germans. 
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In less than two months’ time, Italy attacked Egypt, marking the start of the North 
African campaign, and Greece- the former on September 14, 1940 and the latter on 
October 28, 1940. The diaries provide evidence that Mussolini instigated the Greek war 
simply out of spite for Germany’s unexpected occupation of Rumania.  “Hitler always 
faces me with a fait accompli,” Mussolini angrily confided to Ciano.  “This time I am 
going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the papers that I have 
occupied Greece. In this way the equilibrium will be re-established.”153 The Duce’s 
immense pride barred him from realizing the precariousness of Italy entering into a war 
with Greece, and Mussolini met much criticism from not only military leaders, but also 
Hitler who was “pessimistic and considers the situation much compromised.”154 As 
recorded in the diaries, the three heads of General Staff declared themselves against war 
with Greece and claimed that Italy did not have the equipment or military preparedness 
needed.155 On November 26th, Badoglio, thoroughly disgusted with Mussolini, handed in 
his letter of resignation. Mussolini met the same criticism with his North African 
campaign; by December Marshal Graziani, commander of the Italian army in Libya, 
complained via telegram that his fight was like that “of the flea against the elephant.”156 
 All Italians- government officials, soldiers, civilians- were thoroughly 
disillusioned with Mussolini, Germany, and the war in general. “Those few officers brave 
enough to disagree with decisions of policy risked being humiliated and silenced. Nor 
had parliament ever been allowed any serious discussion of either foreign policy or the 
military budget, and any public reference to possible weaknesses had always been 
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stamped on at once.”157 By January 1941, there were stirrings of an impending coup 
‘d’état that many prominent fascists, such as Bottai, were ready to lead. At this point 
many diplomats had reached their breaking point and realized that something needed to 
be done in order to save Italy from destruction. 
  
Conclusion 
The period from 1938 to 1940 marked a significant change in both the life of 
Galeazzo Ciano and the fascist regime. Ciano was upset by Hitler’s betrayal of the 1938 
Munich Pact; however he agreed to sign the Pact of Steel in May 1939 after instilling 
himself with a false sense of assurance that the fledgling partnership between Germany 
and Italy would help Italy conquer the Mediterranean regions and establish herself, once 
again, as a glorious empire.  
The Salzburg meeting between Ribbentrop and Ciano, just three months after the 
creation of the pact, was a major turning point in Ciano’s opinion of Hitler and the Third 
Reich. As Sir Percy Lorraine reported, whenever “Ciano spoke of Salzburg and of 
Germany’s default on her obligations to Italy, his eyes flashed with indignation.”158 
Ciano’s mentality at Salzburg did not evolve from his growing frustration with 
Mussolini’s political decisions, but rather from his own bitterness towards Ribbentrop 
and Hitler. Both offended Ciano by carelessly dismissing Mussolini’s attempts at peace. 
From this point onward, Ciano openly spoke out against Hitler and the Italo-German 
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alliance; and though he made no initiative to physically rise against the Duce, his 
opinions caused a major political breach between he and Mussolini.  
The events between the remaining months of 1941 and 1942 were not of great 
importance to Ciano’s life. Throughout 1942, Ciano’s disillusionment, and that of many 
men in the diplomatic corps, significantly increased. Italy’s role in the war faltered and 
she suffered both militaristically and politically. The tumultuous months of 1942 sparked 
Ciano’s decision to side with the opposition in 1943, when he worked to strip Mussolini 
of political power. It was the choice that sent Ciano to an early grave. 
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Chapter Two 
The Dissolution of a Regime 
 
Introduction 
 
Within a few days a sham tribunal will make public a sentence which has 
already been decided by Mussolini under the influence of that circle of 
prostitutes and white slavers which for some years have plagued Italian political 
life and brought our country to the brink of the abyss.  I accept calmly what is to 
be my infamous destiny. I take some comfort in the thought that I may be 
considered a soldier who has fallen in battle for a cause in which he truly 
believed.159 
 
The meeting of the fascist Grand Council on July 24, 1943 was the result of 
Italy’s disastrous participation in World War Two. The war severely strained the Italian 
public, soldiers, and elite political circles alike; by 1943 feelings of resentment, weariness 
and distrust plagued all areas of Italian life.  
The nineteen men who voted in favor of the Grandi Resolution did not fathom 
that it would generate such dramatic results: Mussolini was removed from power and 
replaced by Marshal Pietro Badoglio who, along with King Emanuel III, assembled a 
temporary regime that lasted only forty-five days before surrendering to the Allies on 
September 8, 1943. “It was the first time a fascist regime had collapsed, and not just any 
regime either, but the one that had launched the fascist revolution.”160 The immediate 
impact of Italy’s surrender was marred by social and political chaos as the country split in 
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half: one side occupied by the Germans, the other by the Allies. But high-officials of the 
fascist government were oblivious to the bleak futures awaiting them. 
Prior to the summer of 1943, no definitive action was taken to remove the Duce 
from power. However, men of the Corpo Diplomatico were losing patience with 
Mussolini’s political decisions. Ciano was among them. In his last diary entry dating 
December 23, 1943, Ciano bitterly remarked that “[T]he policy of Berlin towards Italy 
was nothing but a network of lies, intrigue and deceit.” Italians were “treated, never like 
partners, but always as slaves. […] Only the base cowardice of Mussolini could, without 
reaction, tolerate this and pretend not to see it.”161 Ciano’s frustrations reflected the 
frustrations of the greater fascist political body; Dino Grandi and Emilio De Bono were 
among the many who worried about the security of Italy’s future as a fascist dictatorship 
because they too disapproved of the Italian-German alliance. Springing from a collective 
desire to end Italy’s participation in a disastrous war, the Grand Council called for, what 
was to be, their final meeting. By doing so, they initiated a wave of change that 
dramatically altered the course of Italian history.  
 
The Departure 
 
 On February 5, 1943, Ciano was called into the grandiose Sala del Mappamondo, 
Mussolini’s office at Palazzo Venezia, and dismissed from his position as the Italian 
Foreign Minister. The news did not appear to shock Ciano, who was used to the constant 
oscillations in both Mussolini’s temperament and decisions; after all, it was one of the 
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Duce’s many unbecoming characteristics that members of the elite diplomatic corps were 
forced to adjust to during the war. In a manner that was both calm and dignified, Ciano 
accepted his release and agreed to become Ambassador to the Holy See. This was a 
pertinent moment in the history of the fascist regime for two main reasons. First, it 
suggested that Mussolini suspected Ciano had been acting seditiously. Just a few days 
prior, a telegram from Hitler, who intercepted it from the head of the American OSS (The 
Office of Strategic Services),162 Allen Dulles, arrived at Mussolini’s office revealing 
Ciano as one of the leaders in developing plans to remove Mussolini from power.163 The 
telegram, dated February 1, 1943, stated:  
When the African Campaign has been concluded and preferably choosing the 
time when illness eliminates Mussolini from political activity, there might be 
made an arrangement with the group Badoglio, Ciano, Grandi, Caballero, 
Umberto. […] It is reported that they are now persuaded that the defeat of Italy is 
inevitable […] It is possible that such a group could deliver a part of the Navy and 
the Army at least, their chances of success being dependent upon (1) ability to 
discard Mussolini, assuming the man is still living; (2) the extent to which the 
Germans would resist; (3) and complete victory in the Allied African 
campaign.164   
It is unclear if this was the leading element in the Duce’s decision to remove Ciano, but it 
nonetheless was an incredibly influential factor that built on other circulating rumors of 
Ciano conspiring against the Mussolini. What this quote does indicate, however, is that 
                                                          
162. James Srodes, Allen Dulles: Master of Spies (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 
1999), 256. Hans Bernd Gisevius- a former member of the German intelligence service who became anti-
Hitler and met and began working with Allen Dulles in 1943 in Switzerland- received cable traffic that 
revealed the Gestapo had intercepted and decoded much of the State Department’s code traffic that left 
Switzerland. In doing so, the Germans discovered Telegram 729, which revealed plots to overthrow 
Mussolini were circulating among the uppermost members of the Italian government.  
163. Lorie Charlesworth and Michael Salter, “Ensuring the After-Life of the Ciano Diaries: Allen 
Dulles’ Provision of Nuremberg Trial Evidence,” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (August 
2006): 571. 
164. Allen Welsh Dulles, Neal H. Petersen, United States. Office of Strategic Services. Bern 
Office, From Hitler’s Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942-1945, ed. by Neal 
H. Petersen (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 35. 
 50
the Allies recognized the uneasy relationship between the Italian Navy and the fascist 
regime. At this time, there was a great amount of disloyalty circulating between them.  
More importantly, Ciano’s dismissal emphasized Hitler’s role in the removal of 
prominent political figures like Ciano; at this stage in the war, Germany held more power 
and influence over Mussolini than did the men of Italy’s diplomatic corps. In an 
interview with America’s LIFE Magazine in February 1945, Dino Grandi revealed that 
the Duce “simply wanted Ciano out of the way”165 and the Foreign Minister was one 
among many men whose position was revoked. Ciano’s dismissal not only revealed 
Mussolini’s growing distrust of the top ministerial leaders, but also the strength of his 
loyalty to Hitler, which caused a significant division to form between the dictator and his 
diplomats. Throughout 1942, Mussolini dismissed many men from their positions, either 
replacing them with other incompetent individuals or claiming the positions for himself. 
As Dulles observed, the constant alterations in Mussolini’s political cabinet “indicate that 
the purpose of the changes in the Italian ministries was to remove from positions of 
responsibility those leaders whose loyalty to the Axis powers was open to question, and 
who might be susceptible to various forms of Allied pressure.”166 Their dismissal 
signified to the world “the first serious rend within the party ranks of the Fascists.”167 
 It is clear that a majority of fascist ministers remained in office for very short 
periods of time; there were a high percentage of ministers (35%) who held political 
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positions for one to three years, while a little over 30% stayed in office for less than one 
year [Appendix Figure One].168 This indicated that Mussolini’s cabinet was in constant 
flux and consequently, the Duce did not have a solid network of people on which to rely. 
Moreover, it suggests that a large number of men who held political titles were robbed of 
much needed time to become acquainted with their position and thus did little to benefit 
the regime. As Italy’s ties to both the war and to Germany strengthened, the Duce shifted 
ministers to a greater extent, and this, as Dino Alfieri suggested, “emphasized that the 
change of ministers in Italy meant nothing more than a confirmation of the Duce’s habit 
of changing his collaborators from time to time. The most that one could say was that the 
will to work with Germany had therefore been even more strongly emphasized by the 
Duce.”169 In light of this, it is safe to say that Ciano’s dismissal was not extraordinary nor 
does it imply that Mussolini was vindictively targeting Ciano at this stage in the war. It 
simply indicates that Ciano was no longer exempt from Mussolini’s rash decisions- now 
he, too, would suffer the brunt of his faith-in-law’s ever-increasing loyalty to Hitler. The 
importance of familial ties was dissipating. 
Mussolini’s control over the Italian government was severely waning, and this 
was further reinforced by the dismissal of his son-in-law. Fascism rested on a bed of 
political disunity, and although this was true for the entirety of its existence, before the 
war Mussolini was able, with the support of the elite fascists, to create a façade of 
strength and aggression that hid the regime’s innate weaknesses. The war systematically 
destroyed this façade and it was now becoming publicly clear that fascism was plagued 
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by fragility and mistrust. This was reflected in a conversation Ciano recorded in his diary 
on January 15, 1943, less than a month before his dismissal: 
Mussolini telephones, wishing to know if it is true that I went to a luncheon at 
Farinacci’s home with Bottai, Scorza, and Turaboni. It is very true. But also 
nothing was more insignificant. Farinacci had invited me to see his new country 
home; a bad luncheon, a banal conversation. Evidently somebody is trying to sow 
distrust and suspicion in the mind of the Chief, and I am sorry that he could fall 
for it even for a moment.170 
This statement reveals that Mussolini no longer had faith in Ciano, a longtime confidant, 
nor the other men who composed his regime’s elite political circle. And Mussolini’s 
insistence on dissolving his political cabinet made fascism inherently weaker. 
Furthermore, Ciano’s tone appears relaxed, which suggests that he had not yet recognized 
the danger of Mussolini’s inquiry.  
   Ciano’s removal was also an ominous foreshadowing of his death. Hitler, unlike 
Mussolini, applauded the Duce’s choice to deplete the regime of any one who hindered 
the German-Italian alliance. Germans were primarily concerned about Ciano because of 
his connection to Dino Grandi, Giuseppe Bottai and Luigi Federzoni, who were all 
suspected of developing plots to overthrow the Duce, break ties with Germany, and 
surrender to the Allies. It was true that Ciano was commonly seen “ceaselessly chattering 
at the Golf Club and in the salons of Rome” about the “anti-German sentiments of the 
upper middle class and the aristocracy. Many of these conversations were reported to 
Mussolini”171 and stirred the pot of distrust. In autumn 1942 when Mussolini’s health was 
failing, many believed that Farinacci or Ciano would succeed him. Although he would 
not outwardly profess his desire to take power from his father-in-law, Ciano came into 
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contact with various groups who were formulating plans to remove Mussolini. He also 
expressed a desire to see if the Allies would consider settling terms with a new Italian 
government. There were a few times when Ciano even mentioned concocting a traceless 
poison to feed the Duce.172 From Mussolini’s perspective, these were hollow threats. 
Throughout his political career, Ciano devoutly followed the commands of his father-in-
law, and not once acted against him, regardless of his personal feelings- the events 
throughout 1938 to 1940 pay testament to this. Ciano was a follower not a leader, and 
Mussolini expected nothing more. What the Duce failed to see, however, was that 
Ciano’s threats indicated that he had seriously contemplated and articulated the 
possibility of assuming a proactive role in the fascist government, and had 
subconsciously prepared the Foreign Minister to politically break from the Duce.     
 The telegram was incredibly unsettling to the Duce not only because of its 
content, but also because Hitler sent it. If Mussolini disregarded the message and allowed 
Ciano to remain in office, he would be simultaneously dismissing the Fuehrer’s warning. 
In order to prove to Hitler, and to himself, his allegiance to the Axis Alliance, Mussolini 
needed to wipe himself free of Ciano. Interestingly, Ciano’s reflections of the event, as 
articulated in his diary, were ridden with remorse rather than anger at having to leave a 
post he occupied for most of his political career.  
To leave the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where for seven years-and what years-I 
have given my best, is certainly a hard and sad blow. I have lived too much, in the 
full sense of the word, between those walls not to feel the anguish of my removal. 
But that does not matter. I know how to be strong and to look to the morrow, 
which may require an even greater liberty of action. The ways which Providence 
chooses are at times mysterious.173 
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Although they may not appear as such at first glance, these were fighting words; almost 
immediately, Ciano’s tone changed from that of remorse to exuding a strong sense of 
personal pride. His statement was, in fact, not a casual acceptance of his fate, but an 
avowal of his strength as a great political leader of Italy. Ciano relinquished his position 
with the premonition that the fascist regime would undergo profound political changes in 
the near future, and that he would be involved in these changes. What Ciano did not 
know, however, was that he would take a central part in bringing about these changes.  
Not only did Ciano hold a high political title, but Grandi also believed that due to 
his personal ties to the Duce, the Foreign Minister might be able to convince Mussolini to 
pass the resolution. (Although the past few years should have been enough indication that 
Ciano had no power to alter Mussolini’s decisions.) Backed by a group of men, Ciano’s 
voice might have some affect. The real question was Ciano’s preparedness to take on 
such a daunting task. His above statement to Mussolini might appear resolute and 
determined; but at the meeting in the presence of the Duce, Ciano had a much harder time 
supporting the resolution’s content. 
Ciano’s dismissal virtually severed the final sense of political obligation he felt to 
Mussolini; although he remained loyal to the Duce and had no initial intention of 
collaborating against him, the door to join the opposition was now unlocked and certainly 
looked more enticing then letting his country go to ruin. Ciano, who continued to express 
a strong personal attachment to Mussolini and stated that he “shall miss […] contact with 
him,”174 was no longer obliged to take a back seat to Mussolini’s idiocies.   
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Giuseppe Bastianini, the former Italian Ambassador to London, replaced Ciano; 
however, the Duce only gave Bastianini the title of undersecretary for foreign affairs and 
granted the title of full secretary to himself. It is important to note that by the time the 
Grand Council met later that July, Mussolini assumed nine administrative titles- prime 
minister, minister for foreign affairs, minister of war, minister of the navy, minister of air, 
first marshal of the empire, minister of the interior, supreme commander of the forces in 
the field, and president of the Grand Council- which was an exorbitant amount for an 
individual to successfully manage.175 Mussolini’s temperament at this time “was such 
that he could not concentrate his attention on general policy or on his duties as supreme 
commander, but continued to indulge his passion for petty administrative details in order 
to give the superficial appearance of being in charge at every level.”176  The Duce tried to 
present himself as a knowledgeable, highly capable political leader and he spent hours 
reading newspapers, police reports and other invalid sources that were tainted with 
inaccuracies.177 Bastianini, like Ciano, experienced problems working with Mussolini 
once he came into office. “When Bastianini had replaced Ciano, he had argued with 
Mussolini about foreign policy and on one occasion, told Ciano his troubles. Ciano had 
laughed. You’re still at the period when it was possible to talk to Mussolini. Now he 
doesn’t listen to anyone and always wants to be right. Happily, his ideas change like the 
wind.”178   
 What Ciano voiced to Bastianini was in fact true- Mussolini’s ideas did “change 
like the wind.” Ironically, Mussolini once again demonstrated his inability to make a 
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clear-cut decision for the day after he discharged Ciano, he humbly asked his son-in-law 
to return. At this point, Ciano already confirmed his position as Ambassador to the Holy 
See and thus politely rejected the offer. Mussolini, apparently feeling trapped between 
two worlds, made rash decisions that were often driven by inconsistent emotions that 
arose from his sense of humiliation at Italy’s increasing dependence on Germany 
throughout the war. Ciano symbolized a crumbling regime while Hitler embodied glory 
and fortitude, thus Mussolini was drawn to the latter; but Mussolini obviously regretted 
his decision and wanted Ciano to return.  
On February 6, 1943 Ciano wrote: “The Duce telephones quite early in the 
morning, to hold up my nomination to the Holy See. […] But I, who had foreseen 
Mussolini’s vacillations, had already sent Ambassador Guariglia to ask the Secretariat of 
State for my acceptance.”179 This was a defining moment in Ciano’s own future, and in 
the future of his relationship with Mussolini; Ciano made a choice to decline Mussolini’s 
offer and officially leave his position as Foreign Minister.  Mussolini’s superfluous 
wartime decisions put Italy in the line of fire for quite a long time, and Ciano was forced 
to either support his country or support his dictator who was plunging it into a state of 
darkness. Ciano chose his country. This was the first time when he made a public display 
of allegiance to Italy over the Duce; the well-being of his country, according to Ciano, 
was more important than the well-being of its leader.180 Unfortunately, this decision was 
made in 1943 not in 1939, three years too late. 
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On February 8, 1943 Ciano ventured to Palazzo Venezia to bid Mussolini a 
formal farewell; it was a cordial visit brimming with tensions of unspoken frustration and 
remorse. As revealed in Ciano’s diaries, the Duce treated Ciano with a sense of 
reverence, professing to his son-in-law that “you must consider that you are going to have 
a period of rest. Your turn will come again. Your future is in my hands, and therefore you 
need not worry.”181 Ciano, warmed by Mussolini’s oath of confidence, made a final 
attempt to convince the Duce of German sedition, and he even used his diary as support:  
He then asked me if I had all my documents in order. ‘Yes,’ I answered. ‘I have 
them all in order, and remember, when hard times come […] I can document all 
the treacheries perpetrated against us by the Germans, one after another, from the 
preparation for the conflict to the war on Russia, communicated to us when their 
troops had already crossed the frontier. If you have need of them I shall furnish 
the details, or, better still, I shall, within the space of twenty-four hours, prepare 
that speech which I have had in my mind for three years, because I shall burst if I 
do not deliver it.’ He listened to me in silence and almost agreed with me.182  
The outburst did nothing to change Mussolini’s allegiance to Hitler, however, indicating 
that although the Duce may have comprehended the validity of Ciano’s declaration, his 
commitment remained to Germany and not to his country. 
 No longer the Foreign Minister and thus, not deterred by political obligations or 
Mussolini’s presence, Ciano underwent profound changes. He slowly “began to plot and 
scheme behind the scenes”183 to find a way to break ties with Germany and salvage 
whatever pride Italy had left. 
He made contacts with anti-Fascists, dissident Fascists and generals known to be 
anti-Mussolini but not necessarily anti-Fascist. A friend described him as ‘a 
politically sick man hanging on to various strings of numerous plots,’ and 
longtime intimate friend Filippo Anfuso said that he was ‘up to his neck’ in so 
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many anti-Fascist, anti-royalist, anti-German plots that Anfuso could not figure 
out ‘who was in what conspiracy.’184 
Ciano was not anti-fascist, but collaborated with any individuals who disagreed with 
Mussolini’s politics and wanted to break relations with Germany. Ciano, like so many 
fascists who regretted the regime’s political and military choices, struggled to envision 
what Italy should become. Worse, his options were limited- the war had gone terribly and 
Italy was in no position to negotiate with the Allies from a position of strength.  
On June 13, 1943, Ciano met with King Emanuel III and expressed his desire, and 
that of many others, to re-instate a new military leader and ask the Allies for an armistice. 
At this point, the King deemed this a treacherous act and, unknown to Ciano, 
immediately relayed the information to Mussolini; however, the King’s feelings changed 
when, on the evening of July 9, 1943, Allied troops landed on the coast of Sicily and 
began a successful operation to take over the island. Ten days later on July 19th the Allies 
bombed the Eastern suburbs of Rome. Italy was slowly taken in the grips of enemy power 
and both the monarchy and the combined powers of Mussolini and Hitler were unable to 
stop it. King Emanuel III watched as flames blanketed the eternal city and “It was then 
that” he convinced “himself that […] Mussolini had suddenly changed for the worse,”185 
and he decided to place Italy’s fate in the hands of one man who could “gather all the 
strings and see to it that the various plots which had received tact approval worked out to 
the benefit of the shaky monarch.”186 This man was Dino Grandi, now chairman of the 
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Grand Council. Grandi, appointed a body of political figures, Ciano among them, with 
the hopes of protecting Italy and salvaging the legacy of Italian fascism. 
 
Digging the Grave 
 The meeting of the fascist Grand Council took place on July 24, 1943. The Grand 
Council had not convened since the start of the war, and it was for the sole purpose of 
transferring military power, a role that Mussolini took on in 1940, back to the King.187 
The meeting marked the first action taken by Ciano and the other members of the 
diplomatic corps to speak out against Mussolini,188 and it initiated an era of change for 
the future of Italian fascism.  Dino Grandi, creator of the resolution and its aim to change 
military hands, professed to American readers in the February 26, 1946 publication of 
LIFE Magazine that the meeting “was our chance, though a desperate one. We had to 
take the Grand Council, a weapon shaped by Mussolini for his own purpose, and turn its 
point against the breast of the dictator. […] To overthrow a dictator and prove it could be 
done by constitutional means, that was our duty.”189 Despite its ‘constitutionality,’ the 
meeting of the Grand Council set into motion a tidal wave of destruction; it led to the 
immediate arrest of Mussolini, the disintegration of the fascist regime, and, most 
importantly, the execution of Galeazzo Ciano. 
Grandi arduously worked to find a group who would back his decree, and he 
knew he could count on the unwavering support of men like Giuseppe Bottai, who had 
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always been against the war.190 He was wary of other individuals, like De Bono and De 
Vecchi, who “all agreed to support Grandi’s resolution, but none of them would take 
responsibility of committing themselves during the meeting unless the debate appeared to 
take a favorable turn.”191 Currently, Ciano was the only man who had enough influence 
to sway members of the Corpo Diplomatico to side with the opposition, and Bottai 
recognized the importance of getting the ex-Foreign Minister on board. Grandi, although 
leery to trust Ciano, understood “that if he were persuaded to support the revolt many 
wavering votes might be given to the resolution.”192 Ciano was hesitant as well to align 
himself with Grandi; although Ciano had his own bouts of anger towards the Duce and 
his loyalty waned, he never rose against Mussolini or honestly professed his feelings of 
contempt towards his weak leadership skills. Ciano and Grandi were not friends, nor was 
there an indication of an innate bond of trust between them: “Count Ciano was a man 
Grandi regarded as the very antithesis of himself in everything, in mode of living, 
political ideas, diplomatic methods, functions within the party, [and in his view of] the 
ideals of fascism.”193 But they each agreed on one thing: the restoration of power to the 
monarchy. Ciano, shoving all differences aside, agreed to join Grandi and his followers in 
pursuit of a goal that would hopefully restore justice to Italy. 
There were inconsistencies and confusion with the Grandi Resolution from its 
birth. “Mussolini’s position was not very clearly envisaged” by members of the Grand 
Council; there were those that “wanted him to disappear altogether, others proposed that 
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he should be given some post but without any power,”194 while some continuously 
vacillated between loyalty to the Duce and loyalty to the opposition. Many of these men, 
nonetheless, disregarded these inconsistencies. Badoglio, while discussing Italy’s present 
condition with Grandi and Federzoni, stated “that whatever was the eventual outcome, it 
would certainly be better than fascism, which had corrupted the soul of the nation and 
finally led the country to its present desperate straits.”195 What Badoglio did not realize, 
however, were the dire consequences the ideological and political divergences between 
members of the Grand Council would have on the outcome of not the resolution, but on 
the integrity of the fascist regime and some of its most prominent members, especially 
Ciano.  
 Interestingly, what appeared to be an organized meeting championed by men who 
were unified in their desire to remove Mussolini from military power, was, in reality, 
plagued by disorder. The men at the meeting desired to remove Mussolini for their own 
personal gain. 
Each petty gerarca (boss) clung to the illusion that it might actually be his 
moment, above all. Grandi, in particular, envisaged a Grandian Fascism which, 
under a Grandi-led government, would keep the authority held by the best people 
and the resultant discipline over the feckless masses but would also, in some 
totally unexplained fashion, magically render Italy’s war happy not sad. Grandi 
was the most pompous and deluded but, should the truth be admitted, he, like his 
colleagues, was worried less about matters of high strategy than about the 
present.196 
Ciano was no different. In his final diary entry on December 23, 1943, he stated that he 
took “comfort in the thought that I may be considered a soldier who has fallen in battle 
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for a cause in which he truly believed.”197 Ciano’s use of “I” not “We” further solidifies 
how Ciano and the other men of the diplomatic corps casted themselves as individual 
heroes of the regime and state. Naturally, from this state of disjointedness birthed chaos, 
and in such an environment it was impossible to formulate a political plan that ensured 
the well-being of both Italy and the men present at the meeting. It was this lack of 
organization and pre-meditated planning that endangered Ciano’s safety in the meeting’s 
aftermath.  
 Guido Buffarini-Guidi, Undersecretary of the Interior, upon hearing about 
Grandi’s conspicuous dealings approached Mussolini with the information; but his efforts 
were immediately disregarded and if the information frightened Mussolini, he failed to 
show it.198 Throughout the previous winter and up until the spring of 1943, a multitude of 
plots were devised that all aimed at taking power from the Duce; but despite the warnings 
he received, Mussolini persistently refused to listen. Perhaps he was too weary from the 
war, or perhaps he lacked faith in the power of his conspirators- whatever the reason, 
Mussolini did nothing to stop his impending downfall. He even made the mistake of 
carelessly trusting certain individuals who aimed to rise against him. For instance, despite 
the admonitions he received about Ciano, he immediately wanted him to return to office 
the day after his dismissal. Yet another example was Mussolini’s replacement of General 
Cavallero with General Vittorio Ambrosio as Chief-of-Staff on January 30, 1943 in what 
Ciano noted as “a good change, imposed by honesty.”199 Mussolini believed General 
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Ambrosio to be the only trustworthy individual in the regime;200 however, Ambrosio was 
“one of the men most deeply implicated in the plots to overthrow him”201 and up until the 
Duce’s removal, Ambrosio slyly networked with Grandi and Ciano.202 Mussolini 
remained ignorant to this, wholly consumed by his personal political predicament.  
 Even Grandi, whom the Duce dubbed “ ‘the finest man Fascism produced,’ ”203 
attempted to forewarn Mussolini of the impending action and at five o’clock on July 22nd, 
he met Mussolini in the Sala del Mappamondo and read him the resolution.204 Mussolini, 
seemingly thinking nothing of it, dismissed Grandi once he finished. Interestingly, a few 
days prior to this encounter, German Field Marshal Albert Konrad Kesselring, who was 
stationed in a villa near Frascati, met with the Duce and noticed how positively the 
dictator spoke of Grandi: “Do you know Grandi? Mussolini asked. He’s just left me. We 
had a heart-to-heart talk, our views are identical. He is loyally devoted to me.”205   
 It is apparent that Grandi, like Ciano, maintained a sense of loyalty to the Duce 
and thus it is arguable if he was prepared to resolutely rise against him. Moreover, 
Mussolini, who was made fully aware of the events to come, completely underestimated 
the power of his political cabinet and thus did not believe they could effectively oppose 
him. In reality, the Grand Council could have convened at an earlier point instead of 
waiting until 1943 to act. This highlighted the extreme political discrepancies among the 
elite governing officials, and it pinpoints the regime’s weaknesses: men of the diplomatic 
corps, like Grandi, had the ability to openly oppose their leader through an approved legal 
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process and nothing was done to stop them. No longer did Mussolini have political 
control, if he arguably had any to begin with, and he was now bound up in a delusional 
reality, completely detached from the chaotic political scene.  
 On the morning of July 24th as Mussolini prepared for the meeting taking place 
later that evening, Rachele, Mussolini’s wife, voiced her concerns; but the Duce, a 
captive to his innate stubbornness, brushed past her warnings. “Rachele, I’m worrying 
about the American tanks, not about Badoglio’s listening-in or the intrigues of the 
others.”206 Once again, Mussolini ignored the power of the Grand Council which he 
believed was, compared to his own power, incredibly minute: 
What do they want? What authority do they have? Only that of orators which lasts 
as long as their speeches. You can be sure,’ he told the head of his police, ‘that I 
won’t find anyone opposing me or causing disturbances. Don’t you know these 
members of the Grand Council? They have poor intelligence, very poor, hesitant 
faith and even less courage. They are people who live because of a light coming 
from a flood-lamp; if you turn off the source, they’ll fall into the darkness from 
which they came.207  
 
Mussolini believed that he was their “flood-lamp” and his acerbic words brought to the 
surface a profound truth, that even he had no faith in the foremost men working beneath 
him to effectively lead the regime. From Mussolini’s perspective, the “spinelessness” of 
his colleagues, men whom he often referred to as “cowardly and lacking in brains,” posed 
little threat to his rule.208 In Italy, Mussolini assumed he “could rely on unquestioning 
obedience.”209  
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 As recorded in Rachele’s diary, Mussolini “honestly believes that everything 
will turn out for the best […] although he did admit the other day that there would 
certainly be a lively debate.”210 Rachele was suspicious of Ciano, and her suspicions were 
further exacerbated when Mussolini caught wind that Ciano had been secretly meeting 
with Grandi and his followers.211 It is hard to understand why Mussolini did not mistrust 
Galeazzo; perhaps it was Mussolini’s faith in family loyalty that allowed him to overlook 
Ciano’s dealings. Galeazzo had not only been his political sidekick, he was also his son-
in-law and thus bound to Mussolini by what seemed to be a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ of 
impenetrable familial bonds. “[I]t will not be difficult for me to shepherd them back into 
the fold—that Grandi, that Bottai, also Count Ciano,”212 Mussolini confidently remarked 
on the eve of the meeting. Ciano had always been a follower never a leader. Mussolini 
had gotten his way with every political decision made thus far. The meeting posed no 
threat- it would “only be clearing the air between friends.”213 
 Mussolini opened the Grand Council meeting with a speech acknowledging that 
he had contemplated splitting from Germany for a long time but ultimately deemed it 
impossible; to do so would “mean the instant annulment of the regime.” It would be 
ludicrous to “give up so easily twenty years’ work and abandon the realization of all our 
hopes, accept the recognition of military and political defeat, the disappearance of Italy 
from the world scene.”214 In order to uphold fascism, Mussolini proclaimed, Italy had to 
maintain allegiance to Germany- only through Germany would Italy be able to solidify a 
respectable standing in the European and Mediterranean world. Despite the 
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circumstances, Mussolini’s outlook had not changed and this further confirmed for the 
men sitting before him the necessity of getting the resolution passed. Ciano was one 
among many who became excited by Mussolini’s opening statements, and he 
unabashedly rose to give a speech thronged with anti-German sentiment in which he 
specified events that, he believed, were reasons for Italy to back out of her alliance with 
Germany.  
 Ciano’s main concern lay root in Hitler’s disregard for the Pact of Steel and his 
move to invade Poland; this event proved that Germany had no respect for Italy, and, 
according to Ciano, it signified a bleak future for Italy if she continued the partnership.215 
In addition to the invasion of Poland, Ciano also discussed his meeting with Ribbentrop 
in August 1939 at Salzburg in which Germany undermined Mussolini’s attempt at peace, 
and deceptively aligned with Russia without informing Italy.216 Although he had 
repeatedly professed these warnings throughout the past few years, Ciano hoped, yet 
again, that his plea would resonate with Mussolini and spark the dictator to act: 
 ‘Let us recall that we can make decisions with full liberty as far as our ally is 
concerned, since it is the Germans who betrayed us, starting the war. We will not 
have to fear any negative judgment by history as far as the correctness of our 
international relations are concerned if we should decide to separate our decisions 
from those of our ally. No one can accuse us of being traitors because the 
incontrovertible truth is this, we will never be the traitors, only the betrayed.’217 
This paragraph sums up Ciano’s reasons for attending the meeting; he did not wish to 
deprive Mussolini of total power, nor did he want the collapse of the fascist regime.  He 
wanted to restore pride and security to Italy, and the only way to accomplish this was to 
either convince or force Mussolini to surrender military power. When Ciano rose to 
                                                          
215. Giuseppe Bottai, Vent’anni e un giorno (24 luglio 1943) (Italy: Garzanti, 1949), 309-310. 
216. Bottai, Vent’anni e un giorno (24 luglio 1943), 309-310. 
217. Davis, Who Defends Rome? The Forty-five Days, July 25 to September 8, 1943, 115-116. 
 67
speak, Mussolini grew incredibly angry. According to Federzoni, who was only a few 
meters away from Mussolini, the Duce’s face was wrought by bitter exasperation:  
Gli occhi roteanti lampeggiavano d'ira appena contenuta, e le mascelle fattesi 
scarne masticavano visibilmente tacite imprecazioni e sinistre promesse contro il 
genero infedele.' E Buffarini Guidi: 'La faccia che fece quando parlò Ciano non 
potrà mai essere descritta.218  
[He could barely contain his anger, which flashed in his rolling eyes, and his 
visibly gaunt jaw chewed and left unspoken curses and sinister promises against 
his unfaithful son-in-law. And Buffarini Guidi stated: I will never be able to 
describe that face when Ciano spoke.] 
This was the first moment that Ciano partook in a planned operation to oppose Mussolini, 
signifying a drastic change in Ciano’s relationship with the dictator. Although Ciano 
expressed his discontent openly, it took him three years to muster the courage and only 
then could he do it in a formal, politically regulated setting among a group of men who, 
for the majority, echoed the same beliefs.  
 Scorza219 and Grandi, who was armed with two hand grenades in case the 
gathering got out of hand,220 also gave speeches in which they pronounced “the urgent 
necessity of putting these reforms and innovations into effect”221 in order to preserve     
“the honour and salvation of the nation.”222 Ciano, Bottai, Federzoni, and Grandi 
continuously reiterated their devotion to fascism, the Duce, and the war if it could be 
continued successfully.223 “But in both moderates and extremists there was an 
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undercurrent of resentment at having been left uninformed and powerless.”224 They 
needed a military change. 
 As tensions increased and the time to vote drew near, the group’s confidence 
wavered and many men who once supported the resolution began to doubt their decision: 
Count Giacomo Suardo, President of the Senate, withdrew his support for Grandi and 
tried to convince people to vote for Scorza’s alternative resolution.225 As ideas ping-
ponged across the table, Ciano also began to second-guess his decision and he proposed 
that a commission be allotted to analyze both Grandi and Scorza’s resolutions to come up 
with a decree that combined the two.226  
Melton Davis claimed that, regardless of Ciano’s displays of arrogance and pride 
he was a very insecure individual, and he felt vulnerable in the company of many of the 
other fascists at the meeting. Ciano did not contribute to the preliminary years when the 
regime was forming, nor had he assumed a prominent role during the March on Rome in 
1922. One of the greatest mistakes that Ciano made, as did many other members of the 
Grand Council, was that he undermined the impact the resolution would have. “No need 
to have any scruples or misgivings, Ciano said, […] It’s simply a memorandum. During 
the discussion we shall, as always, treat the Duce with the utmost respect and 
deference.”227 It is widely speculated that Grandi explained the resolution differently to 
each participant and thus was at fault for the confusion. To some, he magnified its 
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importance, while to others he diminished it,228 revealing a central inconsistency amidst 
members of the opposition. 
Anfuso’s account of the events of that morning provides evidence of how little 
they trusted each other. At Montecitorio, Anfuso says, Grandi and Ciano ‘went 
off and talked together in a corner.’ Then they began arguing. ‘It was clear that 
Grandi hid a lot from Ciano.’ A little later, when Ciano and Anfuso had left 
Grandi and were going back together to Anfuso’s house, Ciano showed that his 
knowledge of the Court’s intentions was as uncertain as Grandi’s. ‘All is 
arranged, you’ll see,’ he said confidingly. ‘The Ministry is already made. Pirelli 
will be Foreign Minister. I believe Vitetti is Under-Secretary. General Carboni is 
Minister of Propaganda.229 
There was no definitive plan. “Everybody’s afraid,’ said Ciano, ‘and it could mean that 
we’ll all finish behind bars. But you’ll see that in the end he will be finished and we can 
straighten things out somehow.’ ”230 Despite Ciano’s decision to support Grandi’s 
resolution, it is evident that he was not entirely wedded to the idea; and thus when his 
presence had a greater impact than expected, he panicked for fear of the ramifications his 
participation might render.   
 Nonetheless, the vote was cast. Nineteen out of twenty-eight men voted in favor 
of the Grandi Resolution,231 Ciano included. The Duce was officially ousted by a 
democratic procedure, which was glaringly ironic.232 It was nearly three a.m. on July 25th 
when everyone left Palazzo Venezia and ventured home. Mussolini was shocked: “Even 
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Ciano, Albini and Bastianini”233 he exclaimed in amazement on his way back to Villa 
Torlonia. Surprisingly, however, the Duce refused to take any immediate action against 
the men who voted against him, which provided these individuals with premature 
feelings of security and excitement that their goal had been accomplished. 
 When Mussolini returned home in the early morning of July 25th Rachele was 
there to greet him. “His haggard, woe-begone face showed how things had gone” Rachele 
wrote.234 “There’s nothing more I can do,” Mussolini confided, “they’re set on our ruin. 
I’m afraid my orders don’t count any more.”235 For nearly twenty minutes Mussolini 
described the meeting and the surprising events that took place. Rachele “only interrupted 
him once when he said that Galeazzo had sided with the opposition. He too! I cried, 
shocked to the core, thinking that though life has its mysterious ways, there are times 
when the burden seems too hard to bear.”236 Ciano’s vote against the Duce was perhaps 
the most rattling event for the Mussolini family; through one flick of his pen Ciano 
instantly severed not only political ties but, most importantly, familial ties. Ciano’s 
signature transformed the resolution into his personal suicide note.237 It was for this act 
he would pay.  
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“The city is dead”238 
 On the afternoon of July 25th, Mussolini, exhausted and plagued by intense 
pains from his stomach ulcer, ventured to Villa Savoia despite Rachele’s warnings 
against it. “I’m a man of honour,” Mussolini told her, “we have a pact with Germany to 
which we cannot be false. The King signed it too and we must discuss the matter 
together. If necessary, I shall remain at the head of the services to see that we keep our 
word.”239 Mussolini adamantly believed in the King’s loyalty: “He’s a friend. He’s on my 
side.”240 Mussolini continued to indulge himself with the delusion that the Grandi 
Resolution was utterly powerless and that he remained head of the regime.  
 The meeting between King Emanuel III and Mussolini lasted no more than 
twenty minutes;241 the conversation was affable but their words were weighted with 
undertones of extreme apprehension concerning the present political situation.  Upon 
descending the steps to leave, Mussolini was approached by Captain Vigneri who 
claimed he was “ordered by the king to protect your person.”242 A feeling of doubt seeped 
into Mussolini’s subconscious as he saw an ambulance round the corner, and he refused 
the offer, insisting that he wanted to take his own car. Captain Vigneri persisted and it did 
not take long for the Duce to concede and enter into the back of the ambulance. At this 
moment, unbeknownst to Mussolini, the once almighty fascist dictator was placed under 
arrest. The Duce was now a prisoner of the monarchy and the newly instituted Badoglio 
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regime; and he remained this way for two months until the Germans rescued him on 
September 12, 1943 at Gran Sasso.  
 The responses to Mussolini’s arrest varied: a majority of Italians celebrated the 
news and reveled in their “sudden gift of liberty.”243 Reactions among the fascist political 
circles, however, were extremely different.  
One minor gerarca [boss] committed suicide […] and one or two others, 
including Farinacci, fled in disguise to hide in the German embassy: but dozens of 
leading fascists, headed by Grandi and Starace, at once wrote to ingratiate 
themselves with the new regime and congratulate Badoglio on his accession to 
power.244  
Ciano left the meeting without much concern for his personal safety: “In a few hours 
Mussolini will have me arrested […] But then the king will take away his power and I 
will be let out.”245 It is evident that Ciano was completely oblivious to the resolutions 
outcome, and was overconfident in the king’s ability to save him from punishment.  
After Ciano heard of Badoglio’s promotion to head of government and 
Mussolini’s arrest, he was flabbergasted: “What a mess, he said. It’s the collapse of 
everything. Now they will handcuff us as well”246 Badoglio, against the king’s wishes, 
sought to eliminate all members of the fascist Party,247 and Ciano was one of his primary 
targets- his relationship with Badoglio was already tense. Badoglio was looking to arrest 
Ciano for the “enormous, illicit fortune”248 the Foreign Minister had acquired throughout 
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his political reign; meanwhile Ciano had documents that revealed illegal, and unflattering 
information about Badoglio’s military past.249 
 Ciano and his family were in grave danger, and both General Ettore Muti and 
General Ambrosio recommended that Ciano try to obtain passports from Badoglio and 
flee.250 This met with no avail, however, and Ciano was at a loss. As Edda recounts, on 
July 31st Ciano resigned from his position as Ambassador to the Holy See and remained 
in his house for two weeks,251 unsure of how to act or where to go. After much insistence 
from Edda, who, unlike Ciano, liked the Germans very much and was highly favored by 
Hitler, the Ciano’s resolved to ask Germany for help to escape to Franco’s Spain where 
they could seek protection. Ciano was apprehensive about the idea, but his desperation 
prevailed and he supported Edda in her pursuit to contact German Lieutenant, Colonel 
Eugene Dollman, who was head of the Roman S.S..252 This decision was without a doubt 
an absurd one, but it illuminates the extreme anxiety plaguing Ciano at this time and his 
inability to develop a well thought-out plan to ensure his survival. In such a state of 
emergency Ciano was quick to capitalize on any hope of salvation. 
On August 27th, Galeazzo, Edda and their children boarded a flight to Munich 
where they were supposed to rest and obtain passports for their second, and final, flight to 
Spain; however, upon arriving in Munich the Ciano’s were detained and placed under 
house arrest. The Germans wanted two things from Galeazzo: his diaries and his life. The 
Diaries revealed information about the Third Reich that was highly confidential and 
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unflattering; information that, if fallen into Allied hands, would humiliate the German 
empire and illuminate many of the wartime crimes she committed. As Goebbels 
recounted in his diary:  
The Fuhrer rightly suspects that such memoirs can only be written in a manner 
derogatory to us for otherwise he could not dispose of them in the international 
market. There is therefore no thought of authorizing Ciano to leave the Reich: he 
will remain in our custody, at least for the present.253  
Securing the diaries was most essential. If fallen into Allied control, they would be a 
major “political weapon,”254 and could be used as “a master directory for both short and 
long-range politico-military intelligence.”255  Furthermore, Hitler, who already held the 
ex-Foreign Minister in great contempt, hated Ciano even more after the Grandi 
Resolution was instituted and wanted him punished as a traitor of the regime. Extreme 
fascists, such as Alessandro Pavolini, Minister of Popular Culture until January 1943 and 
later head of the successor of the fascist Republican Party, also believed that the members 
of the diplomatic corps who voted against Mussolini, especially Ciano, should be 
executed as traitors. Their vote was an attack on Mussolini’s personal character, a direct 
challenge to his ‘fascism.’ 
On September 15, 1943, a few days after German troops rescued Mussolini from 
Gran Sasso, Mussolini met with Hitler and it was here that the Fuehrer expressed extreme 
disdains for the men who took part in removing Mussolini from power just a few months 
prior. Hitler’s main focus was Ciano. “It is obvious that the Duce cannot start criminal 
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proceedings against the traitors of Fascism if he is not willing to call his own son-in-law 
to account,” Goebbels concluded in his diary. “If he were a man of really great 
revolutionary caliber, Mussolini would have asked the Fuhrer to hand Ciano over to him 
and would personally have taken him to task.”256 When he heard of Mussolini’s arrival in 
Germany, Ciano requested a meeting with him. “This means this poisonous mushroom is 
again planted in the midst of the new Fascist Republican Party, Goebbels commented in 
disgust.”257 Although the meeting did nothing to change Ciano’s situation, it suggests that 
Mussolini wanted to forgive and pardon his son-in-law. The Duce was already extremely 
hesitant to punish the fascist traitors, which baffled Hitler and left him disillusioned with 
the faltering dictator. Mussolini recognized this, and perhaps from a mixture of 
embarrassment, fear, and a need to exert his masculine dominance, he reluctantly agreed 
to punish Ciano and the other men who rose against him. As the Duce noted: “To vote for 
the Grandi resolution meant opening the crisis of the regime and my succession; to 
plunge it, in other words, into the abyss. […] Ciano himself was not ignorant of these 
ends, and he played the extreme game with them.”258 And if nothing was done to 
vindicate the regime, then Italy’s prestige, Mussolini feared, as well as his own would be 
destroyed in the eyes of the Germans.259   
Ciano and his family were sent back to Rome on October 17, 1943 where Ciano 
was to face the long-awaited consequences of his involvement in the Grand Council 
meeting.260 On October 19th, Ciano, accompanied by Frau Felicitas Beetz,261 an agent of 
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the German security service who was given the task of discovering the whereabouts of 
Ciano’s diary and diplomatic papers,262 departed from Munich and landed in Verona 
airport where he was immediately arrested and incarcerated in Verona’s Scalzi Prison. 
Only six out of the nineteen members who voted for the resolution were found and 
detained: Luciano Gottardi was arrested at the end of September, while Carlo Pareschi, 
Emilio De Bono, Giovanni Marinelli and Tullio Cianetti were arrested in early 
October.263 Others, such as Grandi, fled Italy and took refuge in places like Spain.264 
 
Conclusion 
 In the aftermath of the meeting, most of the Grand Council members were well 
aware of the dire repercussions they would face and thus fled the country; but there were 
some who believed there were no serious consequences and thus stayed in Italy. Ciano 
was among them. He had faith that the Grandi Resolution would bring about more 
positive changes than negative, and that he played an essential role in helping Italy rise 
from her degenerative state. Unfortunately, Ciano was wrong and he would soon face 
ramifications for the major role he played in the resolution’s birth. 
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 Although Grandi was the resolution’s creator and primary champion, Ciano 
became a symbol of the Grand Council Meeting and thus of Mussolini’s demise. 
“Mussolini never holds many heads responsible for anything,” Filippo Anfuso once 
stated to Italian journalist, Curzio Malaparte. “He needs only one head, a head that seems 
to be made for that special purpose. He would hold Galeazzo responsible. What other use 
could there be for Galeazzo? Mussolini keeps him for that special purpose.”265 Many 
members of the diplomatic corps recognized this from the start, and they were only 
proven true by the events following July 24th. Ciano was blamed for the initial 
disintegration of Italian fascism, and he represented the downfall of the regime and its 
dictator. 
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Chapter Three 
Le Memorie 
 
Introduction 
 
Un giorno non troppo lontano il ventennio fascista finira relegato in qualche riga nei 
libri: ma si ricordera sicuramente il processo di Verona, non tanto dalla prospettiva 
storica, quanto da quella familiare. Una tragedia che uccise corpi e anime…266 
[One day, not too far away, the two decades of fascism will be relegated to a few lines in 
a book: the Verona Trials will be remembered, not so much from a historical perspective, 
but from that of a family. A tragedy that killed bodies and souls…] 
 
On the morning of January 10, 1944 Count Galeazzo Ciano, along with four other 
members of the Grand Council, were sentenced to death by firing squad. It was a moment 
that resonated deeply among extreme fascists267 and Germans, who vehemently 
supported Ciano’s death, and the Duce himself, who painfully grappled with executing 
his son-in-law and once close friend. The meeting of the fascist Grand Council in July 
1943 and the consequent fragmentation of the fascist regime that followed all set the 
stage for the 1944 Verona Trial and the untimely fate that Ciano and the four men met.268  
To some, Ciano’s death was well deserved: he was a traitor to the Axis alliance, 
his country, his regime, and his family. But to many others, Galeazzo’s death was an act 
committed by a prideful dictator trying to reassert control over a crumbling regime. 
Ciano’s presence at the Verona Trial and his subsequent execution is controversial, as 
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indicated by the high number of historical sources and accounts that have opposing 
opinions and viewpoints on the event and its main actor. Nonetheless, the trial is one of 
the most important events of Ciano’s political career, not simply because it brought an 
end to his life, but because it illuminates the complexity of his role in the fascist regime 
and of his overall character.  
 
A “ ‘Premeditated Murder’ ”269  
The Verona Trial took place on January 8, 1944 in the Castelvecchio hall located 
in Verona.  Although it was open to the public, the courtroom was primarily filled with 
extreme fascists and German soldiers who eagerly awaited for justice to be restored to the 
regime.270 The meeting of the fascist Grand Council left a bitter taste in the mouths of 
extreme fascists present at the trial, and in the name of the regime and the Duce, they 
desired retribution. Even before the tribunal began there was a prefixed notion that the six 
men would be deemed guilty despite all effort to prove their innocence. Just before nine 
in the morning the six men- Ciano, De Bono, Pareschi, Marinelli, Gottardi and Cianetti- 
filed into the courtroom. “Old Marinelli came in with a bewildered expression. The other 
defendants were calm.”271 Ciano walked “in with a display of bravura,”272 looking 
composed in a beige overcoat, dark brown sports jacket and a pair of gray trousers.273  
Ciano and the five other men were the only members of the Grand Council who 
were caught and brought to trial. The others either left Italy or were able to renounce 
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fascism and join Badoglio’s regime, and thus cleverly cheated punishment. Although the 
six present at the trial still supported the Grandi Resolution, individuals like Marshal De 
Bono, who was seventy-eight a the time, and Carlo Pareschi, the former Minister of 
Agriculture, adamantly claimed there had been no pre-meditated plot to overthrow 
Mussolini. “I have never thought that the Duce should leave his post as Head of 
Government: my devotion to Mussolini was boundless,”274 stated De Bono, while 
Pareschi confessed that “It never passed through my mind that the Duce should leave 
office.”275  
Meanwhile, there were a few whose loyalty to the Grandi Resolution changed: 
Cianetti  swore that he had withdrawn his vote for the resolution immediately after it 
passed, claiming that his confidence in Mussolini was strong.276 Moreover, Gottardi, the 
former President of the fascist Confederation of Industrial Workers, stated that he only 
voted for the resolution to “liberate the Duce from the grave responsibilities of military 
command when the war was taking such a bad turn.”277 Gottardi further claimed that he  
had the clear impression that there was a split between the Party, the people, and 
the army, and that the morale of the nation was shaken. Since it emerged from the 
Duce’s own account at the Grand Council that the army did not want to fight, I 
thought that, if the Crown took a direct part in the fortunes of the war, perhaps the 
army would be able to recover.278  
He, like Cianetti, feared the consequences of opposition.  
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Moreover, sixty-five year old Marinelli, former Treasurer of the Party, suffered 
from bad hearing and consequently barely heard any of the speeches made at the Grand 
Council meeting- he voted for the resolution, believing that because the Duce was 
present, it was ok to do so.279 The personal statements of the first five men were 
important; however it was Ciano’s testament that the judges eagerly awaited. Ciano’s 
involvement in the Grand Council meeting sparked the most controversy due to his 
personal ties to the Duce. It went unspoken that he was not only on trial for betraying his 
regime, but also his family. The dual-nature of Ciano’s crime was recorded in the 
memoirs of one Judge at the trial, Renzo Montagna. According to Montagna, there was a 
unanimous vote to condemn Ciano because his actions were considered to be the most 
despicable among the men for two reasons:  
primo, perche era parente del Duce, e poi perche unicamente al Duce doveva 
l’alta  sua posizione politica. Non c’e, difatti, chi non pensi che egli sarebbe 
eternamente rimasto nella categoria della gente oscura, se non avesse sposao la 
figlia di Mussolini.280  
[first, because he was a relative of the Duce, and then second because he owed his 
high station solely to the Duce. There are those who, indeed, think that he would 
have eternally remained in the category of obscure people if he had not married 
the daughter of Mussolini.]  
Family loyalty was a basic yet highly valued part of Italian culture and so Ciano was 
deemed a traitor to the Duce in both a political and familial sense. This was one of the 
major reasons for Ciano’s condemnation and downfall. 
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When Ciano took the stand to pledge his case, he was arguing against a sentence 
that had already been carved into stone. The ex-Foreign Minister beamed with anger.281  
I reject categorically and indignantly the accusations against me,’ he said. ‘They 
represent an offense to my entire past as a citizen, soldier and above all 
Fascist…If the Duce had asked me about the meeting of the Grand Council, I 
would have advised him against it because in that moment such a convocation 
was not prudent, due to the international repercussions it could have…With my 
vote I only intended to engage the Crown and make it intervene in the war 
because it had remained outside it during the entire conflict.282 
Ciano persisted onward to prove his innocence, claiming that “Grandi never suggested 
[…] and I never imagined that the resolution would cause the fall of the régime.”283 He 
had only “voted for Grandi’s motion because I wanted to commit the monarchy, and 
force it out of its nebulous state.”284 But his attempts met with no avail.  
The statement above indicates that Ciano was fully aware that the accusations of 
treason made against him had no legal justification. In actuality, Ciano’s involvement in 
the events of July 24th were perfectly legal- Mussolini permitted the members of the 
Grand Council to meet and cast their vote for the resolution, knowing all the while that it 
would strip him of military power if the vote passed.285 Consequently, the trial’s purpose 
was not to punish Ciano for his participation during the meeting, but to legally and 
systematically disparage Ciano’s image as a diplomat, as a fascist, and most importantly 
as a son-in-law in order “to place Mussolini morally with his back to the wall”286 and 
reestablish the integrity of the fascist regime. Ciano recognized this. In a letter dating 
December 23, 1943 that he wrote to the King while imprisoned at Scalzi, Ciano referred 
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to the trial as “nothing else but premeditated murder.”287 This was the argument that 
composed Ciano’s entire defense. As expressed in Edda’s memoir, Ciano was “Il Duce’s 
Achilles’ heel”288: Mussolini’s decision to kill Ciano “carried a heavy implicit message. 
It signified the boasted liquidation of the bourgeois version of Fascism, with its weak 
acceptance that […]corruption and high living, ideological equivocation and practical 
realism, are necessary parts of life.”289 More importantly, it signified the Duce’s 
unwavering commitment to Hitler and the Italo-German alliance; and this was 
acknowledged throughout Italy and Germany.  “There can be no doubt, an Italian 
diplomat wrote to Mussolini from Berlin, that the Verona trials have revealed here that 
Republican Italy has cut its link with the past, and intends to be near to Germany always 
and in every way.”290   
It is important to note, however, that on two separate occasions before the trial 
Mussolini acknowledged that he did not believe Ciano, De Bono, Pareschi, Marinelli, 
Gottardi or Cianetti were the main culprits of the Grandi Resolution. In a conversation 
with Edda in Munich in mid-September 1943, shortly after the Duce was freed from 
captivity on September 12th, Mussolini admitted that “Most of those who voted the 
Grandi motion did so in good faith, though they were idiots. The only real traitors are 
Grandi, Bottai, Federzoni, Albini, and Bastianini.”291 Oddly, the “real traitors”292 were 
not present at the trial- either a result of their masterful escape artistry or the inability of 
the fascist search party to find them. The following month while speaking to one of his 
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secretaries, Giovanni Dolfin, Mussolini confessed that “Ciano was no better and no worse 
than the others. All the hatreds that focus on him are designed to strike against me.”293 
Ciano was a pawn in Mussolini’s game, and his condemnation enabled the Duce “to 
conceal his own manifold failures and contradictions”294 in an attempt to restore both the 
pride and power of fascism. Ironically, the Verona Trial was Mussolini’s last exhibition 
of dictatorial strength in the newly established Republic of Salò.295  
The men who were tried alongside Ciano were simply there as “an excuse,”296 
Edda admitted years later. They were the unfortunate sufferers of a prosecution targeted 
at one specific individual.  “It is horrible to think that those men are dead only because 
my husband had to die,” Edda remorsed. “I have often been saddened by the thought of 
those wives who suffered because of us.”297 As Judge Renzo Montagna revealed, Ciano’s 
case was the only one that procured a homogeneous consensus. 
 Quando viene la volta di Ciano, la discussione si svolge invece in un’atmosfera 
di solidarieta, poiche in tutti era la convinzione che proprio lui, parente del Duce, 
non avrebbe mai dovuto, per nessun motivo ed a nessun costo, dare la sua 
adesione ad un atto che tendeva a defenestrare l’Uomo al quale egli tutto 
doveva!298  
[When it came Ciano’s turn, the discussion takes place in an atmosphere of 
solidarity, because the conviction of all was that he, a relative of the Duce, should 
never, for any reason and at no cost, adhere to an act intending to unseat the man 
to whom he owed everything!]  
If the death sentence was not issued, Ciano and the other defendants would have been 
killed either in the courtroom itself after the verdict was given, or in the police van on 
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their return to Scalzi prison.299 The judges’ lives were also on the line: if the prisoners 
were not found guilty, the judges, would have all been shot by the fascist guards in the 
courtroom.300 “We were determined not to allow Ciano to escape…” Nicola Furlotti, 
commander of Ciano’s firing squad, stated to Italian journalist Gian Franco Vené in an 
1967 interview.301  
 The trial spanned for two days. When the Clerk finally read Ciano’s deposition, 
time seemed to stand still for it was the most highly anticipated deposition of the trial.302 
It pleaded not guilty of treason. “It may be that I committed an error, but it is out of the 
question to mention treason, which would contrast with all my activity as a soldier, a 
Fascist and a man.”303 Ciano’s error, the deposition stressed, was not synonymous with 
betrayal.  
 The official sentence of the men was not determined until the morning of January 
10th. Everyone but Cianetti, who was condemned to thirty years imprisonment, was 
sentenced to death:304 
[H]aving, on the occasion of the vote taken by the Grand Council of Fascism on 
25 July 1943 in Rome, conspired among themselves and attempted to destroy the 
independence of the State and of having thwarted, by the encouragement of 
illusions of easy terms of peace, not only the moral resistance of the nation but 
military operations also, and, by doing so, of having given aid and comfort to the 
enemy.305  
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Reminiscing about the event, Aldo Vecchini, the tribunal President, stated that “When he 
came to Ciano, he recalled Ciano’s reaction upon learning from Ettore Muti [the former 
Party Secretary] of the arrest of Mussolini: It is too bad; now they will handcuff us as 
well. That demonstrated, he said, that Ciano was more concerned about himself than 
about the fate of his chiefs, his benefactor and relative.”306 This further validated, at least 
for Vecchini, the reason for Ciano’s execution, which was scheduled for the morning of 
January 11, 1944. And it suggests that throughout the trial’s entirety, Ciano was treated 
with extreme hostility. In reality, the trial was staged and the ex-Foreign Minister entered 
the courtroom already a condemned man. 
 
The Death of Five 
As dawn peeled back night’s heavy blanket and daylight slowly illuminated the 
inside of Scalzi prison where the five men sat in despair, rumors circulated that Mussolini 
had called together a Cabinet meeting at Gargnano.307 In a final attempt at salvation the 
men had signed a request for pardon the previous night,308 and they hoped that the 
meeting was summoned in order to grant their requests. But it was an empty hope- their 
plea was held up by Alessandro Pavolini, the now successor of the fascist Republican 
Party, who wanted to spare the Duce “the necessity of confirming the death sentence,”309 
and the meeting never took place.  
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Although he did nothing to intervene,310 Mussolini wrestled with his decision 
throughout the entire night; at three o’clock in the morning, he telephoned General Wolff, 
the Supreme SS and Police Leader of Italy, with the hope that Ciano’s life, and that of the 
remaining four, could be spared.311 According to Ribbentrop, Germany wished to be 
informed of the proceedings but maintained “that the trial of Ciano is exclusively a matter 
for the Duce, and that on our side no pressure whatever shall be exerted in favour of a 
condemnation.”312 General Wolff, relayed Hitler’s orders that Ciano’s case was “an 
exclusive and absolute internal Italian nature”313 and if Mussolini failed to follow through 
with the execution, he would lose the Fuehrer’s respect. Ciano’s fate was sealed by this 
phone call. The execution was confirmed at eight o’clock that morning, and by nine,314 
Ciano, De Bono, Pareschi, Marinelli and Gottardi, accompanied by German escorts, were 
driven to the shooting range in a suburb of Verona called Forte San Procolo.315 
Ciano suffered from fits of rage and he cursed Mussolini during the drive; but 
upon arriving at the execution site, the ex-Foreign Minister became an exemplar of 
bravery and stoicism.316 As Ciano was tied to a rickety wooden chair that faced away 
from the firing squad, he remained “perfectly composed” and refused the blindfold that 
was offered to him.317 He was a starring comparison to his companions, some of whom 
were on the brink of fainting or trembling in fear. In his last few minutes, Ciano solemnly 
confided to the priest: “We were all swept away by the same storm […] Let my children 
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know I died without bitterness to anyone.”318 As the executioners raised their guns, De 
Bono, in one last display of pride, sounded a triumphant shout that was echoed by Ciano: 
“Long live Italy!”319 
  Immediately before orders were given to shoot, Ciano looked over his shoulder 
and boldly faced the gunmen as if to stare death in the face [Appendix Image One]. It 
was an act that “cheated the symbolism of fascist political justice, which insisted that 
traitors be shot in the back.”320 “Spara!” yelled Nicola Furlotti, the chief of police in 
Verona and the commander of Ciano’s execution.321 The sound of gunshots and bullets 
connecting with flesh pierced the air. According to one German report it was an 
embarrassing display of gunmanship; all five men were inaccurately hit and thus 
“writhing and screaming”322 in pain. Ciano was among the suffering and twisted in agony 
on the ground until a man approached him, held a pistol to his head, and put a bullet into 
his temple, ending his life.  
 When informed of Ciano’s death, Mussolini detachedly remarked that “Justice 
has been done”323; to the Duce, “Ciano ha[d] been dead for ages.”324 Despite Mussolini’s 
cold exterior, his wife Rachele revealed that he was incredibly depressed and mourned 
the loss of his son-in-law by “weeping tears of despair”325 in the privacy of his own 
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room. The Duce was also haunted by guilt, for after the trial and execution he made a 
point to pardon all traitors.326  
The Germans were avid supporters of the execution. In Filippo Anfuso’s 
summary of a German dispatch from Berlin to the Duce, it was affirmed that “[M]embers 
of the Grand Council had to be punished as examples not only to the Italian masses, but 
also to the Germans.”327  Moreover, Anfuso stated that 
The Fuhrer and Ribbentrop had spoken […] of Count Ciano bitterly, but without 
hatred. For them, there no longer existed a Ciano case but a general phenomenon 
of a political nature which had to be resolved in conformity with their political 
interests. […] I heard many people who, referring to the terrible tragedy which 
was weighing our country down, uttered a few words of sympathy for Count 
Ciano, whose marked intelligence and handsome appearance were admired in 
Germany. The connection of his name with so many recent events in German 
history had created a halo of sympathy for him which in the heart of a people like 
this, had not faded away. I repeat on the other hand that the opinion of this ruling 
class on the political crime of which the nineteen members of the Grand Council 
were guilty, is different and resolute: that the crime is not only condemned, but 
they are asking here why it was not condemned before […] In any case, there can 
be no doubt that the Verona trials have revealed here that Republican Italy has cut 
its link with the past, and intends to be near to Germany always and in every 
way.328 
While some German citizens sympathized with Ciano, most German government 
officials were satisfied that he, along with the other men who supported the Grandi 
Resolution, was killed. From their perspective, Ciano’s death eliminated the main source 
of opposition against the Italian-German alliance and thus it indicated a positive future 
for the partnership. Additionally, it confirmed Mussolini’s unwavering commitment to 
Hitler.  
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There were many, however, who were displeased with the execution. At the end 
of May 1944, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Serrano Súñer, made it clear to Mussolini 
that Ciano’s death was a “political error.”329 Mussolini’s responded with evident 
detachment: “I have sometimes thought that the end of Count Ciano would have 
particularly saddened you, and this I understand. In the many agitations of my life, what 
happened at Verona has been the most dramatic chapter. Sentiment and raison d’état 
have sharply collided in my spirit.”330  Likewise, many Italians were shocked that 
Mussolini permitted a member of his own family to die in such a brutal and dishonorable 
manner. As Renzo Montagna predicted, the trial and execution only highlighted the 
Duce’s own inhumanity at being able to kill “il marito di sua figlia e padre dei suoi 
nipoti”331 [the husband of his daughter and the father of his grandchildren]- it marred his 
role as a respectable family man and as a powerful dictator.332  
 
Remembering Galeazzo Ciano 
Photographs play a significant role in shaping historical memory, and 
reconstructing and understanding the past. Images throughout the war, particularly those 
of the fascist regime, have become interwoven into historical culture and affect, either 
consciously or subconsciously, how history is remembered. Sometimes, if powerful 
enough, a photo can redefine a historical event or figure- imagery has the power to 
fabricate an entirely new history. Many have tried to understand Ciano’s death and his 
ethical character throughout the war, including diplomats, leaders and historians alike. 
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And when trying to make sense of the array of interpretations, the picture of Ciano’s 
execution acts as a good platform off of which to start. The snapshot of Ciano bound to a 
chair, his head turned to catch a glimpse of the firing squad behind him immediately 
before he was shot, has become a popular image of the war that has shaped Ciano’s 
legacy after his death. It captures Ciano in a moment of defiance. His head is turned and 
thus he died while ‘looking death in the face,’ an act that challenged his conviction as a 
traitor to fascism.333  
This was one of the final images taken of Ciano, and it is the only one of the 
execution that has gained prominence; and in it Ciano appears brave, perhaps inquisitive, 
and utterly defiant of his death as traitor. The twist of his head elucidates the strength of 
his inner spirit. Ciano vehemently upheld his innocence up until his death, a fact entirely 
supported by the photograph. Undoubtedly Ciano was corrupt, and he spearheaded many 
immoral wartime atrocities that will forever taint his character; yet there is something 
admirable in the way he met his fate. This photo captures Ciano not as a dissolute fascist, 
but as an individual who steadfastly believed in his fight for the good of Italy. And 
arguably, this is how he is remembered by a majority of wartime figures and historians.  
Winston Churchill, for example, labeled Ciano’s death as an episode in “keeping 
with Renaissance tragedy.”334 Ciano and the five men, according to Churchill, fell victim 
to Mussolini’s “wave of calculated vengeance”335 and “died bravely.”336 The Verona 
Trial and subsequent execution no doubt influenced Churchill’s historical interpretations 
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of Ciano and Mussolini, and the legacy of Italian fascism. Ciano’s character, and his role 
as a principal member of the Corpo Diplomatico, is unmistakably overshadowed by the 
brutality and injustice of his death, and, for some, it has reincarnated him into a martyr of 
the fascist regime. Ciano is included in two of Churchill’s wartime memoirs, the second 
volume, Their Finest Hour, and the fifth volume, Closing the Ring.  Not only did Ciano’s 
diaries assist Churchill in composing his six-volume memoir of the Second World War, 
as evidenced in the extensive bibliography; but it is clear that Churchill used Ciano as a 
looking glass into the world and workings of Italian fascism and her partnership with 
Nazi Germany. Through Ciano’s trial and execution, Churchill was able to excavate the 
mind of Benito Mussolini and most importantly understand where to place fascist Italy in 
the context of his historical wartime memory. According to Churchill, “Mussolini’s 
submission to Hitler’s vengeful demands brought him only shame, and the miserable neo-
Fascist republic dragged on by Lake Garda- a relic of the Broken Axis.”337 Thus, Ciano’s 
death, which Churchill dubbed an “Italian tragedy,”338 was a reflection of Mussolini’s 
deference to Hitler and ultimately marked the beginning of the internal collapse of the 
Italian fascist regime.  
While many historians focus on his cruel, often unjust acts throughout World War 
Two, they also focus on Ciano’s execution as a traitor and the controversy surrounding 
his death. Due to this, Ciano is often perceived as a weak-minded, cowardly individual 
who bore the brunt of Mussolini’s political failures. The picture of the execution is also 
an overarching symbol of the fascist regime itself: the boldness of Ciano’s actions attest 
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to the workings of a new regime that broke from old fascist traditions, one in which the 
main political body articulated their dissatisfaction with the course of the war, and, in 
1943 actively opposed Mussolini and the Axis Alliance. This was a major turnaround for 
Italian politics, and a significant change in the course of the war, and it is all symbolized 
in one picture.  
The photograph of Benito Mussolini at the time of his death lies in stark contrast 
to that of Ciano. In April 1945, Mussolini, along with his lover Claretta Petacci and a few 
loyal fascists, attempted to bypass German patrols and flee to Switzerland. Italy, 
occupied by both the Germans and the Allies, was in an ever-growing state of desperation 
and hostility, which posed a threat to Mussolini’s security; however right before reaching 
the border, Mussolini was shot multiple times by Italian partisans, severely beaten, and 
then taken to Piazzale Loreto in Milan where he was hung up by meat hooks from a gas 
station roof truss, a spectacle for everyone to see (Appendix Image Two).339 This image 
of Mussolini- bound and hung upside down by his feet as if he were livestock, hands 
extended above his head in a position of final surrender, his skull and face severely 
broken and swollen, making him utterly unrecognizable- is one of the most widely 
circulated photographs of the Duce. This was also one of the last images taken of 
Mussolini and thus it also determined how his legacy was remembered by the world. 
Both Mussolini’s body dangling in the Piazza and its pictorial depiction acted as visual 
verifications of the regime’s downfall. The Duce’s deformed body elucidates the intense 
violence and chaos of his murder. The photograph of the dictator bound and mutilated 
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became a metonym of Italy at this stage in the war- her people were starving, thousands 
had died, and the land had been ravished by German patrols and Allied bombs.  
The juxtaposition of these two images reflects the powerful influence of imagery 
on the human psyche and historical memory. The photograph of Mussolini is the 
complete antithesis of the photograph of Ciano. Mussolini’s death was unexpected but 
the photo was staged- it was taken with the intent to stir the viewer’s emotions. In death, 
the Duce represented the dismemberment and ruin of Italian fascism. Ciano’s death, on 
the other hand, was planned but the picture was not. It was an accidental occurrence that 
captured an emotional moment in Ciano’s life. It was an honest moment in time- Ciano’s 
movement is natural and his true emotions are exposed. The photograph pays testament 
to Ciano’s bold stoicism, a boldness that shaped Ciano’s historical legacy and the varied 
interpretations of his character.  
Many historians interpret the “judicial murder”340 of Galeazzo Ciano as an event 
in keeping with Mussolini’s other wartime blunders. It was another attempt by the Duce 
to salvage his political eminence and personal pride that was challenged during the events 
of July 24th. According to Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini’s “overriding preoccupation was 
that others must not think him weak or guilty of nepotism, and he explicitly said that 
‘reasons of state’ must, on this occasion, take precedence over legality.”341 Mack Smith 
pieces together the trial and execution, not with extreme sympathy towards Galeazzo 
Ciano, but with the acknowledgment that the Verona Trial, although disguised as a legal 
proceeding, cleverly averted regulations of the Italian judicial system in order to kill a 
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man who had embarrassed and insulted the Duce and the entire regime. Likewise, 
Richard Bosworth referred to the Duce as “a coward of the most profound sort”342 who 
found no true justification for killing Ciano. Mack Smith and Bosworth, both 
distinguished historians of Italian fascism, view Mussolini with contempt. Mussolini, 
rather than Ciano, is the primary target of their criticisms; and this is true in a number of 
historical interpretations.  
In September 1985, Mussolini and I, a film documenting Mussolini’s rule and 
downfall, aired on HBO. The movie, directed by Alberto Negrin, a native of Casablanca, 
Morocco, and story and screenplay by Nicola Baddalucco, a native of Milan, Italy, 
tracked the downfall of the fascist regime and examined the Duce’s numerous complex 
relationships, particularly that with Ciano, who was played by Welsh actor Anthony 
Hopkins. The film was entirely in English and thus directed for a predominantly 
American audience; however it was translated and shown in Switzerland, France, Italy 
and West Germany and thus it became a multi-cultural film appealing to both the Eastern 
and Western hemisphere.  
Throughout Ciano appeared not only as a political figure but also as a family man, 
a lover, and most importantly a loyal son-in-law to the Duce who constantly grappled 
with his own morality. Negrin and Baddalucco, like Mack Smith and Bosworth, portray 
Mussolini as a hollow leader desperately trying to hide behind a veil of maturity and 
strength but in reality, lacked all of these qualities. In the film, Mussolini did not want to 
sentence Ciano to death, but he did so anyway for fear of losing respect from Hitler and 
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loyal fascists. The Duce’s personal prestige remained the highest priority. There was not 
a moment in the film that Mussolini came across as a likeable character; when Ciano 
meet him in Munich and begged for his life to be spared, the Duce, after much angry 
banter, promised Ciano his security. The promise was false and Ciano was killed, further 
reinforcing Mussolini’s incapability to fulfill his own political desires.  
 Ciano, in comparison to Mussolini, was a likeable character throughout the film. 
He was loyal to the Duce and to the regime, and it is clear that his sole purpose for voting 
in favor of the Grandi Resolution was to better Italy. One day prior to the meeting, Ciano 
and Edda are shown on a beach when Ciano nonchalantly mentions the impending 
conference. Ciano contends that his sole intent is to transfer military power to the King, 
and that he loves Mussolini. Negrin and Baddalucco did not present Ciano as a traitor to 
the Duce or the regime, but rather as an individual torn between love of family and love 
of country. While at the Grand Council meeting, Ciano pleaded with Mussolini, but the 
Duce grew angrier and threatened Ciano and the others who favored the Resolution: 
“Don’t fool yourselves, any of you. I’m not about to turn myself into a firing squad.”343 
The Grand Council meeting was staged as a fight between the protagonist, Ciano, and the 
antagonist, Mussolini- a classic Hollywood portrait of good versus evil. And the viewer 
cannot help but pity Ciano, a victim of the both the regime’s, and Mussolini’s, 
mercilessness. 
 More importantly, the film dedicated a scene to Ciano’s execution and 
emphasized the moment in which Ciano turns his head to stare down his executioners. 
When Mussolini was killed in the last scene, however, his death was announced over the 
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radio. The film placed more importance on Ciano’s execution, and it was evident that 
producers modeled the execution scene off of the photograph. Hopkins turned his head to 
look at his executioners just like Ciano. The fact that Ciano’s, and not Mussolini’s, death 
was shown suggests that Ciano’s death was more controversial and unjustified than was 
Mussolini’s. After Ciano was killed, the priest present at the execution informs Mussolini 
of his son-in-law’s death. The priest’s voice is filled with contempt and Mussolini looks 
horrified. This was an important moment that showed Mussolini’s blooming guilt over 
allowing the event to occur.  
 Negrin and Baddalucco do not mask their opinions of Mussolini or of Ciano, and 
it is interesting to see the way in which they track Ciano’s career throughout the war. 
They did not portray Galeazzo as the leader of the catastrophic Greek war, a “mistaken 
war,” as it was dubbed by Mario Cervi, that cost the Italians and Greeks hundred of 
thousands of dead and wounded”344; or as an ignorant diplomat “engaged in making 
love” rather than politics.345 These unflattering details of Ciano’s life are purposefully left 
out, and only the  remaining years of Ciano’s life, 1943 and 1944, the years in which he 
attempted to do some good for Italy, are shown. This is important for two reasons: it 
makes Ciano appealing to the viewers, who can’t help but sympathize with his 
unfortunate plight. Moreover, the film’s focus on the Grand Council Meeting, the Verona 
Trial, and Ciano’s execution suggest that the filmmakers believed these were the most 
historically important moments in Ciano’s life. While they are significant episodes, they 
do not fully encapsulate the realities of Ciano’s role in the fascist regime and his 
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relationship with Mussolini. The film’s limited timeline further obscures an already 
complex story.  
Ciano’s contemporaries, as well, had a wide range of opinions after his execution; 
and a common response was one of pity. Notably, to the Allies, he was a controversial 
figure- Ciano understood that the partnership between Germany and Italy was destructive 
yet did nothing to stop it. Sumner Welles, the American Under Secretary of State who 
met with Ciano in the Spring of 1940 and remarked on the Foreign Minister’s humanity 
and simplicity,346 composed the introduction of the English translation of The Ciano 
Diaries 1939-1943 in which he lay-forth that Ciano was “the amoral product of a wholly 
decadent period in Italian, and for that matter, in European history. To him morality in 
international relations did not exist. He was wholly seized of the concept that only makes 
might makes right.”347 According to Welles, Ciano’s immorality was a construct of the 
time and place in which he lived: he “was a creature of his times, and the times in which 
he had his being are the least admirable mankind has known for many centuries.”348 
Ciano’s actions were not indicative of the nature of his true character; and as Welles 
contended, when the Foreign Minister was away from the political limelight he 
“possessed both dignity and personal charm” and “there was not the faintest trace of the 
pompous and self-conscious fascist dignitary who appeared in public.”349 Welles did not 
absolve Ciano for his numerous political, social, and economic wrongdoings, but rather 
approached Ciano as the unfortunate prototype of the fascist regime- a diplomat who 
lacked the courage to resign from office after the solidification of the Italian-German 
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alliance. Ciano’s major flaw was his inability to actively fight against Mussolini’s 
wartime policies.  
 It was obviously difficult for men like Welles to cast Ciano in a solely negative 
light after they conversed with the Foreign Minister in a private setting and seen a 
different, more attractive side to him. Although accounts from those who had personal 
ties with Ciano may contain biases, they still illuminate important characteristics that 
often go unnoticed in broad historical accounts; and by doing so, they make Ciano’s 
character more multifaceted than often perceived. Curzio Malaparte,350 an Italian 
journalist sent by the newspaper, Corriere della Sera, to cover the fighting on the eastern 
front, was Ciano’s friend351 and his depiction of the Foreign Minister testifies to the 
intricacies of Ciano’s personality. Throughout his memoir, Kaputt, Malaparte recorded 
numerous conversations, which reveal Galeazzo’s constant emotional oscillations: one 
minute Ciano feared Mussolini, the next he spoke of the Duce with great contempt, the 
next he feared for his own life, and the next he filled himself with delusions of his 
personal safety.  
‘I will always be Galeazzo Ciano, even if I cease to be a Minister. My moral and 
political position will only stand to benefit if Mussolini sends me away. You 
know what the Italians are; they will forget my mistakes and my sins, and they 
will see my only as a victim.’   
[…] 
‘You are mistaken,’ I said. ‘The Italians are no longer what they once were. They 
would be pleased to see you die—him and you. Him and you, and all the others.’  
‘And what would our deaths accomplish?’ asked Galeazzo. 
‘Nothing. Nothing at all.’  
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Galeazzo was silent. He was pale and his brow was damp with sweat. At that 
moment a girl crossed the meadow on the way to meet a group of golfers who 
were walking towards the clubhouse, swinging their putters in their hands. 
‘What a good-looking girl!’ Galeazzo said. ‘Would you like to have her?’ and he 
gave me a slight dig in the ribs with his elbow.352  
 
Ciano appeared juvenile, naïve and wholly detached from the plight of the Italian people. 
Based on Malaparte’s personal account, Ciano recognized and articulated concern for his 
safety; however he continuously tried to deceive himself by avoiding the crisis and 
changing the topic of conversation. These faults, according to Malaparte, made for a poor 
diplomat but they were not cause for Ciano’s execution; rather Ciano was Mussolini’s 
scapegoat,353 “a tool of tyranny rather than a tyrant.”354  
Malaparte’s view is very much in keeping with that of Welles, namely that Ciano 
was a product of the environment he lived, groomed to unquestionably abide by 
Mussolini’s command.  
Galeazzo trembles from morning till night in fear of the kick in the behind. Face 
to face with Mussolini, Galeazzo is like everybody else, like all of us—a 
frightened menial. He always says ‘Yes’ to Mussolini. But behind Mussolini’s 
back, he has the courage of a lion and is afraid of nothing. […] No one can deny 
that he has wit or intelligence.355  
 
This presentation of Ciano’s relationship with Mussolini differs from many other 
historical interpretations. Although Ciano was incapable of standing up to Mussolini and 
thus appears as an inept political leader, Malaparte generalized this negative 
characteristic with the rest of the Italian populace. Malaparte bridged the gap between the 
Italian social and political circles by connecting Ciano’s plight with that of the general 
populace. This suggests that members of the Corpo Diplomatico were not the only ones 
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who ‘trembled’ in Mussolini’s presence- the Italian masses lived in fear as well. Ciano’s 
downfall came to represent their unfortunate plight, and due to his familial ties to the 
Duce and his unsavory label as traitor, he received a great deal of their criticism and 
blame. Malaparte alleviated Ciano of a great deal of political responsibility that has often 
dampened his historical image.  
 No doubt Ciano “was a mass of contradictions”356 who “displayed a crippling 
political and personal immaturity” which was coupled with his genuine desire to break 
from Germany and collaborate with the Western democracies.357 Ciano’s former political 
colleagues recounted the dual-nature of the ex-Foreign Minister’s professional character: 
he was at times self-important and greedy, just as much as he was kind and decent. Dino 
Alfieri acknowledged that “Ciano was a good-natured, generous man”358 but this was 
hard to tell at times due to the “fickleness” and “inconsistency”359 of his personality, 
which often perplexed those around him. Alfieri maintained that Ciano was serious and 
even cynical at times, but by nature he was “extremely vivacious, whimsical, inquisitive, 
ironical, and sentimental. He always had a ready retort and his wit was facile and 
spontaneous.”360  
Giuseppe Bastianini, the Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had a 
different opinion of Ciano. He believed that the former diplomat was pompous and 
insecure. Ciano “didn’t give the minimum satisfaction to those diplomats who were not to 
his taste. To those who might have in some way, even without warning it, touched his 
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susceptibility or that of Mussolini, he made his own aversion felt severely.”361 Felix 
Gilbert agrees with Bastianini. Gilbert contends “There was a kind of silent war, between 
Ciano and his young men on the one side and the professional diplomats on the other. 
Ciano wanted to keep all the threads in his own hands”362 due to a distrust of his 
colleagues and for his personal betterment. Ciano’s concern, according to Gilbert, lay in 
any area that gave him political prestige and power, as exemplified by his participation in 
the annexation of Albania in April 1939 and the Greek war in October 1940.363  
The same contentions were held abroad. In 1939, an American paper portrayed 
Ciano as a socialite overtaken by the frivolity of the Italian social scene.  
 
Before his marriage Galeazzo was another of those golden lads who liked to hang 
around the Excelsior and Grand Hotels in Rome, where rich U.S. heiresses 
generally stayed. He had been a cub reporter and a society journalist who did bits 
of drama and literary criticism for an obscure Roman sheet. After that his father 
managed to get him minor posts in the consular and diplomatic service. Few 
people thought he displayed great ability except that languages came-easy to 
him.364  
 
Ciano did not have the wisdom or the experience of the older diplomats, a majority of 
whom had been involved in the fascist movement since its birth. Consequently, many 
saw Ciano’s promotion to Foreign Minister not as an advancement that was rightly 
earned but one resulting from nepotism. Edda, Ciano’s wife, was arguably Mussolini’s 
favorite daughter and she held much political sway when it came to making these 
decisions; moreover, the Duce was incredibly close to Ciano’s father, Costanzo, and 
promoted Ciano to full-fill Costanzo’s political legacy. 
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Ciano was a man loved and hated, respected and disrespected, by his peers and 
the multi-varying interpretations of his character directly correspond with the 
inconsistencies seen throughout his diplomatic career and in his dealings with Mussolini 
and Germany. Despite the array of opinions, Bastianini and Alfieri did not label Ciano a 
traitor. Alfieri was among the men who voted in favor of the Grandi Resolution, thus his 
interpretation of Ciano may be biased because of his political affiliations. Bastianini, on 
the other hand, did not vote for the resolution and thus was in the closest position to judge 
Ciano’s actions in the Summer of 1943; however he did not do so. Although Bastianini’s 
opinion of Ciano is unflattering, he does not brand Ciano a conspirator despite their vast 
political differences. The same can be said for Gilbert. It is crucial to overlook the 
negative interpretations of Ciano and recognize that uncomplimentary opinions are not 
synonymous with labeling him a traitor.  
In the archives of the Italian newspaper, the Corriere della Sera, there is an 
ongoing dialogue about Galeazzo Ciano. It is evident that Italians continues to grapple 
with the life of Ciano, his mark as traitor, and the legacy of the fascist regime that 
undoubtedly lives on in Italy today. On July 24, 2003, in commemoration of the 60th 
anniversary of the Grand Council Meeting, the Corriere della Sera published an article 
taken from a collection of Edda Ciano’s memoirs.365 Throughout the piece, Edda 
reflected on the dramatic events of July 24, 1943 and the execution of her husband. “Non 
sapevo che sarebbe venuto un tempo in cui avrei dovuto scegliere fra mio padre e mio 
marito,”366 [“I did not know there would come a time when I would have to choose 
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between my father and my husband”] Edda professed. Mussolini ordered Ciano to be shot 
“perché non aveva il coraggio di opporsi ai tedeschi che reclamavano la sua testa.”367 
[“Because he did not have the courage to oppose the Germans, who wanted Ciano’s 
head”]. 
 The subtitle of the article reads, “Il 25 luglio nel racconto della donna che sposo 
<<il traditore>> Ciano.”368 [“The story of July 25th by a woman who married “the traitor” 
Ciano.”] The quotations around “traitor” alludes to the controversy still surrounding 
Ciano’s death. Even in the 21st century there is a debate over labeling Ciano a traitor; 
clearly, many Italians do not take the mark seriously. Ciano’s execution sparked a new 
public dialogue, one that focused on his demise rather than his role leading up to and 
during the war. There is a national and international fascination, not with the Ciano 
family in general, but with one particular event- Galeazzo’s execution. Publishers of the 
Corriere della Sera recognized this fascination when they published Edda’s recollections 
of the events. Ciano’s legacy continues to perplex 59 years later. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In 1942, Ciano confessed to Serrano Suñer, Spanish Minister of the Interior and 
Foreign Affairs: “Life is always good and pleasant. When I am eighty I shall stroll along 
here swinging my cane and enjoying the lovely sun. I want to die here in Leghorn after I 
have seen all my enemies passing before me on their way to death.”369  Ciano’s prophecy 
                                                          
367. Ciano, “Edda, figlia del dittatore per l’ultima notte.” 
368. Ciano, “Edda, figlia del dittatore per l’ultima notte.”  
369. Gordon, “Ciano and his Ambassadors,” 516. 
 105 
largely reflects how he saw himself leading up to his death. He was a hero, fighting for 
the just cause of Italian redemption and prosperity.  
Although Ciano was labeled a traitor, he vehemently denied this denunciation and 
went to his grave fighting. On December 14, 1943 while detained in Scalzi Prison, Ciano 
proclaimed his belief that “Che il voto del Gran Consiglio sia stato un errore, lo ammetto 
e gli errori pesano sugli uomini e sui popoli, ma respingo la parola tradimento con 
disprezzo.”370 [That the vote of the Grand Council was an error, I admit, and errors weigh 
on men and people, but I reject with contempt the word treason.] ‘Traitor’ was an 
insulting term that had enough power and influence to permanently ruin an individual’s 
reputation. In Ciano’s circumstance, however, it did not tarnish his name but ignited a 
historical dialogue over the controversial nature of his character and role in the fascist 
regime that has continued into the 21st century. 
The photograph of Ciano’s execution significantly influences how Ciano is 
viewed and interpreted throughout the annals of history. The photograph also 
significantly shape how Ciano’s legacy is remembered today. Pictures are cross-cultural. 
They provided ways for Ciano’s execution to transcend international lines. The meaning 
imbedded within Ciano’s defiant stare and bold twist of his head are comprehendible to 
people everywhere. The image of Ciano with his head turned to face his executioners is a 
bold display of bravura that causes historians to debate his death as a traitor, and the 
importance of his role as the Italian Foreign Minister during World War Two. 
As evidenced by the national and international responses of historians, diplomats, 
and others, attitudes towards Ciano range from extreme disdain to pity. Nonetheless, 
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Ciano is never labeled as a traitor. Instead, historiography condemns Mussolini’s faulty 
leadership as the reason for Ciano’s death. The complexities surrounding Ciano are 
intriguing and at times confusing, but they nonetheless allude to the controversy of his 
role during the War as well as the many dimensions of his character. Ciano’s label as 
traitor cannot be taken at face value. To do so would obscure a significant period in 
Italian history and the involvement of the leading political figures. 
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Epilogue 
The Afterlife 
 
Life is not what one lived, but what one remembers and how one remembers in order to 
recount it.371  
 
The location of Ciano’s body after his death was no secret. The ex-Foreign 
Minister was immediately returned to his family and then transported to Livorno where 
he was buried in the Ciano family Mausoleum. The tomb is nestled atop the Monte 
Burrone and hovers high above the village. It remains completely isolated from the hustle 
of civilization. To the untrained eye, it does not look like a sacred burial site. In an online 
photo blog from August 2010, an inhabitant of Livorno posted pictures of the Ciano 
Mausoleum and revealed that when he “was a kid I suspected that this massive structure 
[…] was a money bin of sort.”372 To many residents, the tomb is an obscure building, its 
meaning cloaked in mystery.  Mussolini originally ordered the construction of the tomb 
in honor of the death of Costanzo. It was intended to be a grandiose structure, but its 
construction was halted by the war and today it stands unfinished, a skeletal remnant of 
Italy’s fascist past and its leaders.  
Mussolini’s body, on the other hand, was not so quick to find a resting place. 
After being on display in Milan, the Allies ordered that Mussolini’s body, along with the 
bodies of Claretta and the other murdered fascists, be taken down from the roof truss and 
prepared for burial.  At first, Mussolini was buried in Musoco Cemetery in Milan beneath 
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an unmarked grave; but his body was dug up and moved numerous times until, after 
many requests from Rachele, it was permanently buried in the Mussolini family vault in 
San Cassiano cemetery on September 1, 1957.373 It was here that the Duce was given a 
small, private ceremony; after much controversy, Mussolini’s death was finally granted 
some closure.374  
When Ciano’s body was put to rest in Livorno, his prevalence in Italian politics 
was put to rest as well. There was no mystery or intrigue surrounding the location of his 
body; everyone knew what had become of the Italian diplomat. It was the exact opposite 
for Mussolini. Italians desired to know what had become of their Duce. In an interview 
with the New York Times in November 2011, Sergio Luzzatto, author of The Body of Il 
Duce and professor of history at the University of Turin, stated that “The vitality of 
Mussolini’s afterworld life was great as long as the mausoleum didn’t exist. A corpse that 
is nowhere is everywhere.”375 Mussolini’s legacy gained prominence from the mysterious 
twelve year disappearance of his corpse, and over time he has been revitalized as a 
central figure in Italian society in both the political and commercial spheres.  
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“[I]n this land of Caesar, can Mussolini be far behind?”376 
Elisabetta Povoledo, a journalist for the New York Times, composed an article 
last November 2011 on Mussolini’s tomb, which has become a famed tourist attraction 
and place of worship since 1957 and receives between 80,000 to 100,000 visitors a year. 
Povoledo interviewed numerous people who flocked to the grave. Gianni, a man from 
Turin, stated that some Italians simply want to pay their respects to Italy’s fascist past: 
“We don’t want to restore that era, we just don’t want to deny it either.”377 Fascism is an 
undeniable part of Italian history and culture; Mussolini’s tomb has become a historical 
symbol, and it provides visitors with the chance to connect to and make amends with 
their country’s tumultuous past.  
There are Italians, however, who glorify the fascist regime; they view it as “an 
epoch in which they believe that Italy, in contrast to today, counted for something in the 
world.” 378 The Mussolini name still remains in Italian politics today. In 1992, Alessandra 
Mussolini, the granddaughter of the Duce, began her political career as a member of the 
Movimento Sociale Italiano, and she is now a member of the Chamber of Deputies, the 
lower house of the Italian Parliament. Italy is a county “where Fascism is a political force 
and followers of Mussolini hold high office.”379 For some, Alessandra’s involvement in 
the Italian government is a constant reminder of Italy’s fascist past; and the people who 
continue to visit and pay respects to Mussolini’s tomb “constitute a disturbing trend” of 
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Italian political ideology. To some,  “the return of Fascism” is inevitable. “The feeling 
was that the country desperately needed to have law and order restored, and Fascism 
seemed the only avenue available, though the price would be high.”380 “Italy needs a 
distinct change, […] said Enrico Cozzani, the owner of a security firm based in Lucca. 
We’re the laughingstock of Europe.”381 Although fascism was a thing of the past, it 
constantly hovers over the Italian populace as an institution, not associated with its 
terrible downfall, but rather with its almighty birth in the early twentieth century. Italians 
desire power, influence and respect- qualities that the Duce once projected. Visitors of 
Mussolini’s grave are a powerful testament to the influence and importance of the Duce 
to many Italians today. Mussolini’s ghost continues to haunt Italy. 
On the main street in Predappio near Mussolini’s tomb, there are a number of 
shops that sell fascist paraphernalia and memorabilia, such as Mussolini calendars.382 
One vendor beamed that these items sold better than his “sexy calendars”; these 
businessmen and women “just keep another kind of tourism at large.”383 A tourism in 
which dictators and dictatorships are trivialized. Arguably through this 
commercialization, the brutality of the Duce, and fascism as well, is not only minimized 
but also imbedded into the foundations of Italian society. Consequently, Italians and 
tourists alike become desensitized to Italy’s horrifying past. Mussolini’s “second Rome,” 
the Esposizione Universale Roma, or the EUR still stands today outside the center of 
Rome. It is now home to a number of businesses and residential homes. Fascist murals 
and engravings cover buildings, while fascist statues of horses and men pepper well-
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manicured lawns and walkways; but these remnants of Italy’s fascist past often go 
unnoticed by the people who live and work in this area. Like the Ciano Mausoleum, they 
have subconsciously become a part of the Italian psyche, a normative feature of daily life. 
Fascist symbols are scattered throughout Rome as well, engraved on the uppermost 
corners of buildings and walls. Even the walkway encompassing Rome’s Stadio Olimpico 
is adorned with fascist emblems and phrases so that every time a futbol fan glances down, 
he or she is instantly reminded of Italy’s militaristic past. 
Today, Mussolini’s vault is kept in pristine condition. Fresh flowers envelop the 
tomb and it is frequently visited by those who wish to pay their respects. The Ciano 
Mausoleum, on the other hand, is abandoned. It is overtaken by vegetation and trash, and 
graffiti covers the inner and outer walls. To the unknown viewer, it looks like a decrepit 
hangout for Italian thugs. It receives the occasional visitor, but not many desire to tackle 
the hike up Monte Burrone. Ciano, unlike Mussolini, plays no role in the Italian 
commercial or political limelight. Even in “Verona, memories of Ciano had faded. A 
plaque marks the site of the Scalzi Prison where he was held, a site now largely occupied 
by a modern bank. Across the street, there is a statue of Don Chiot, the prison chaplain 
who witnessed the execution.” But there is nothing to commemorate Galeazzo Ciano.384 
So where does he fit in to Italian society? How does his legacy continue? History. Ciano 
has created an ongoing, ever important historical dialogue that has helped historians and 
the public alike to understand fascist Italy in the midst of World War Two. To understand 
Ciano’s contradictory nature and emotionally tormented soul is to understand the depths 
of Italian fascist politics, the inner workings of a disjointed regime that fell to the idiocies 
                                                          
384. Moseley, Mussolini’s Shadow: The Double Life of Count Galeazzo Ciano, 265. 
 112 
of its dictator. Ciano’s diaries nourish an ongoing historical debate that is not about 
resurrecting his character but about interpreting and understanding Italy’s fascist past. 
Ciano’s body now lies in seclusion yet it speaks to the ambiguities of modern Italy, ones 
that Italians would be well served to confront. 
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Pictures: 
 
 
(Moseley, Ray. Mussolini's Shadow: The Double Life of Count Galeazzo Ciano. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999.) 
 
Image One: The photograph of Ciano’s execution on January 11, 1944. Ciano is sitting 
farthest to the right in the beige overcoat. His head is turned to stare down his 
executioners.  
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(Moseley, Ray. Mussolini's Shadow: The Double Life of Count Galeazzo Ciano. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999.) 
 
Image Two: The bodies of Benito Mussolini (left) and Claretta Petacci (right) hanging 
from a gas station roof truss in Piazzale Loreto, Milan on April 29, 1945.   
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